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THE ONGOING BATTLE OVER WEINGARTEN
RIGHTS FOR NON-UNION EMPLOYEES IN
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS: WHAT DO
TERRORISM, CORPORATE FRAUD, AND
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE HAVE TO DO WITH IT?
SARAH HELENE DUGGIN*
INTRODUCTION
National leaders have called on all Americans to make sacri-
fices to combat terrorism, corporate fraud, and workplace vio-
lence. Under the guise of responding to these concerns, in its
recent decision in IBM Corporation,' the National Labor Relations
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America; formerly Vice President & General Counsel, National
Railroad Passenger Co.; Chief Counsel, University of Pennsylvania Health Sys-
tem; and Partner, Williams & Connolly, Washington, D.C. My deepest thanks to
Kirk Renaud for his unfailing support and editorial advice; to Roger Hartley,
Jon Hiatt and Jim Coppess for their insights and comments on drafts of the
Article; to Kesha Hawkins and Steve Young for their invaluable help with
research; and to Jean Connelly for her tireless assistance with preparing the
manuscript. This Article had its genesis in an inquiry into employee rights in
the context of corporate internal investigations. While the right to union or co-
worker representation is traditionally associated with workplace investigations
involving rule violations, tardiness, or similar issues, in recent years the rapid
expansion of the internal investigation as a tool to protect business entities
from civil and criminal liability has significantly expanded the scope of investi-
gations in the workplace. For a more general discussion of issues pertaining to
employee interviews in the context of internal investigations, see Sarah Helene
Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the
Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859 (2003).
1. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (June 9, 2004). The employees peti-
tioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review
of the decision, but the petition was voluntarily withdrawn and the case dis-
missed in November 2004. Schult v. NLRB, No. 04-1225, 2004 WL 2595890
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 2, 2004) (per curiam). The NLRB has subsequently applied its
IBM holding in other cases. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No.
127, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 16, 2004) (confirming that, pursuant to IBM, "an
employer in a non-union workplace need not accede to its employees' requests
for the presence of a co-worker," but an employee "cannot be disciplined for
making such a request"); BLT Enterprises of Sacramento, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B.
No. 39, slip op. at 1 n.3 (Aug. 27, 2005) (affirming pro forma finding of viola-
tion of employee's pre-IBM right to co-worker representation but denying rem-
edy in light of IBM holding "that employees in a non-unionized workplace do
not have a right to representation at a disciplinary interview"). In a related
context, in October 2004, the NLRB ruled against an employee disciplined for
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Board ("NLRB" or "Board") unfairly and unnecessarily deprived
American workers of a basic procedural protection. Citing "the
troubled times in which we live,"2 "ever-increasing requirements
[for employers] to conduct workplace investigations.... the rise
in instances of workplace violence[,]... the increase in the num-
ber of incidents of corporate abuse and fiduciary lapses ...
and... the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath,"'
in IBM Corporation the Board eviscerated the right of non-union
soliciting a co-worker to serve as a witness in a sexual harassment proceeding
before a state administrative body. See Holling Press, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45
(Oct. 15, 2004). The Board held that employee efforts to secure co-worker
assistance with legal actions outside the workplace are not protected by the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000) [hereinafter NLRA].
The majority ruled that the point of the external proceeding was to vindicate an
individual claim. Consequently, the employee was not engaged in concerted
action for "mutual aid or protection" within the ambit of Section 7 of the
NLRA. See infra note 20, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). Member Liebman dissented,
objecting to the distinction drawn by the majority between workplace investiga-
tions and external proceedings involving employment discrimination claims.
She opined: "This was a textbook example of 'circumstances where individual
employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action.'" Hol-
ling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op. at 4-5 (quoting Meyers Industries (Mey-
ers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). In support of her position, Member Liebman noted
that four of the five NLRB members in IBM agreed that "an employee's request
for a co-worker representative in a disciplinary meeting is protected, concerted
activity, which cannot be the basis for discipline (even if the employer is free to
refuse the request)." Holling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op. at 5 (citing
IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7 (Battista, Chairman & Meisburg, Mem-
bers, majority opinion); id. at 20 n.13 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting)
(2004)). She further emphasized that "[t]he Board has long recognized that
alleviating unlawful discrimination in the workplace is in the interest of all
employees." Holling Press, 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op. at 6 (citing Tanner
Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1404 (1964)).
2. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7.
3. Id. at 4. In a statement issued October 13, 2004, the Committee on
Labor and Employment Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York challenged the Board's rationale with respect to terrorist threats: "The
Committee ... strongly believes that the events of September 11 and the after-
math should not be used to justify the view adopted by the [IBM Corporation]
majority." Position Paper, Comm. on Labor & Employment, The Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of N.Y. 1 (Oct. 13, 2004) [hereinafter New York City Bar Com-
mittee Position Paper], available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/nyc4-52
9881-11.pdf. The Committee asserted:
that the need to fully protect society from potential terrorist attacks
does not include a need for employers to interrogate employees about
matters that could lead to discipline without a representative pre-
sent .... To rely on such concerns distorts the debate and unnecessa-
rily injects political considerations into a matter that should be
decided on its legal merits and has no relevance to the question of
whether the employee is or is not represented by a labor organization.
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employees to the presence of a co-worker in investigative inter-
views they reasonably believe may lead to disciplinary sanctions.4
In so doing, the Board took away an important procedural pro-
tection once afforded to millions of Americans employed in non-
unionized workplaces. Unfortunately, while it deprives nearly
ninety percent of the workforce5 of a significant right, the
Board's ruling is likely to do little, if anything, to mitigate the
problems it purports to address. The decision exacts a high
price, but offers nothing in return to those who are most vulnera-
ble to corporate misconduct and the impact of terrorism and
other violence in the workplace. Instead, the IBM Corporation
decision undermines the basic policies of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).6
The NLRB's decision to take away "Weingarten rights"-
named for the pivotal U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding
the safeguard in a union context'-is yet another battle in an
Id. at 2. Issues concerning the possible limitation of employee rights in connec-
tion with the threat of terrorist activity also have been raised in another matter
currently pending before the Board. See Firstline Transp. Sec. Inc., Case 17-RC-
12354, rev. granted, 344 N.L.R.B. No. 124 (June 30, 2005) (granting review of
issue of "whether the Board has statutory jurisdiction over privately employed
airport security screeners and, if so, whether the Board should exercise that
jurisdiction").
4. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148.
5. Approximately eight percent of private-sector workers belonged to
labor unions in 2005. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Union Members in 2005 Uan. 20, 2005), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/
pub/news.release/union2.txt. However, about 12.5% of all wage and salary
workers were union members. The overall figure reflects higher union density
in the government sector, with about thirty-six percent of government workers
represented by unions in 2005. Id. The most highly unionized groups are cur-
rently persons working in education, training, library, and protective services
occupations, including firefighters and police officers. Approximately thirty-
eight percent of the workers in each of these groups belonged to unions in
2005. Id. Overall union membership peaked following World War II and
remained strong-including more than thirty-five percent of nonagricultural
workers-through the 1950s. See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations
Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 397, 399-400
(1992) (discussing trends in union membership and possible causes of the
decline in the percentage of American workers who belong to labor unions);
LaDawn L. Ostmann, Union Rights, No Dues: In Re Epilepsy Foundation and the
NLJ?B's Extension of Weingarten Rights to Non-union Employees, 45 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1309, 1340 (2001);John M. True, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Demo-
cratic Rights in the American Workplace, 26 BERKELEVJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 181, 183
(2005) (discussing possible reasons for drop in union membership in private
sector).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
7. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). In Weingarten, dis-
cussed infra Part I.B.2, the Supreme Court upheld the right of unionized
20061
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ongoing conflict over co-worker representation rights pursuant
to the NLRA.8 The degree of protection afforded to American
workers all too often waxes and wanes as political stars rise and
fall,9 and this is particularly true with respect to Weingarten
employees to the presence of a union representative during an investigative
interview that an employee reasonably believes may result in disciplinary sanc-
tions. In a companion case, the Court ruled that discharge of a union steward
for insisting on the right to respond to an employee's request for representa-
tion in an investigative interview violated Section 8(a) of the NLRA. See Int'l
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975). See
also ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 527
(2d ed. 2004) (citing Quality Mfg., 420 U.S. 276). As Gorman and Finkin point
out, because the Supreme Court grounded its decision in Section 8 (a) (1) of the
NLRA rather than Section 8(a) (5), employers have no duty to bargain with
Weingarten representatives. See id. at 405. Following the Weingarten decision,
Congress afforded federal workers who belong to unions similar rights pursuant
to the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a) (2) (B) (2000). The Supreme Court has held that this statutory right
applies even to investigatory interviews by agency inspectors general in
instances in which an employee reasonably believes that the examination may
result in disciplinary action against her. See NASA v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 527 U.S. 229 (1999). See infra text accompanying notes 245-49. For a
general discussion of employee rights in investigative interviews, see Joseph F.
Coyne, Jr. & Charles F. Barker, Employees' Rights and Duties During an Internal
Investigation, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS (Brad D. Brian & Barry F.
McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003).
8. In the words of one commentator, "The old adage that 'nothing is cer-
tain but uncertainty' must have been coined by someone watching the National
Labor Relations Board in action." Paul H. Derrick, Deja Vu All Over Again, 16
S.C. LAw., Sept. 2004, at 24 (2004). The Board first confirmed the entitlement
of non-union employees to the presence of a co-worker during an investigative
interview in 1982 in its decision in Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010
(1982). The Board changed tack and took Weingarten rights away from non-
union employees in E.L DuPont De Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988), enforced in
relevant part, Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001) but
restored these rights in its 2000 decision in Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331
N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), review granted in part, decision rev'd in part & enforced in part,
Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In IBM Corporation,
the Board once again reversed course, this time holding three-to-two that
employees who are not represented by a union are not entitled to Weingarten
rights. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148.
9. See Union, Management Attorneys Disagree on Significance of Recent NLRB
Rulings, 73 U.S. L. WK. LEGAL NEWS 2729 (June 7, 2005) (quoting AFL-CIO
General Counsel Jon Hiatt's criticism of the current Board's elimination of
Weingarten rights for non-unionized employees, as well as its reversal of other
longstanding rulings and unwillingness to utilize available remedies in response
to unfair labor practices). For discussion of the political aspects of NLRB deci-
sion making, see, e.g., Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (noting impact of changes in NLRB membership on Board's interpreta-
tion of NLRA); Tracey Cullen, NLRB Fip-Flops Again on Non-union Employees'
Weingarten Rights, N.Y. EMP. L. LETTER, Nov. 2004, at 2; James 0. Castagnera et
al., NLRB Reverses Application ofWeingarten Rights to Non-Union Employees, TERMI-
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rights.1"' In this instance, the Board claims a new, supposedly
higher, ground for restricting worker protections: physical and
financial "security concerns that are an outgrowth of the troub-
led times in which we live."'' There is simply no support for the
Board's invocation of events that victimize workers themselves to
justify restricting their rights. The Board's mandate is to enforce
the policy of the NLRA, not to restrict workers' rights in response
to concerns beyond its special competence.' 2
The purpose of this Article is to explore critically the novel
policy justifications proffered by the NLRB majority in IBM Corpo-
ration as grounds for narrowing one of the few protections previ-
ously enjoyed by all American workers. Accepting arguendo that
the Board has authority to determine whether or not to require
employers to afford Weingarten rights to non-unionized employ-
NATION EMP. BULL., Sept. 2004, at 2; James 0. Castagnera et al., Termination of
Employment's Annual NLRB Update, TERMINATION EMP. BULL., Mar. 2005, at I
[hereinafter Castagnera, Termination of Update]; Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Law
by Boz-A Theory of Meyers Industries, Inc., Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Bird
Engineering, 71 IoWA L. REV. 155 (1985); Sam Heldman et al., Epilepsy Foun-
dation of Northeast Ohio and the Recognition of Weingarten Rights in the Non-
Organized Workplace: A Manifestly Correct Decision and a Seed for Further Progress, 17
LAB. LAw. 201 (2001); Michael D. Moberly & Andrea G. Lisenbee, Honing Our
Kraft?: Reconciling Variations in the Remedial Treatment ofWeingarten Violations, 21
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 523, 587 (2004); Christine Neylon O'Brien, The
NLRB Waffling on Weingarten Rights, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 114-15, 142-43
(2005); Edwin S. Hopson, National Labor Relations Board Reverses Prior Decision
and Limits Weingarten Rights to Union-Represented Employees, FED. LAW., Oct. 2004,
at 21, 23.
10. See supra note 8. The dispute in Weingarten involved a unionized work-
place. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251. Consequently, the Court had no occasion
to address the question whether Weingarten rights are available to members of
non-unionized workforces. See infra Part I.B.2.
11. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7.
12. It is well settled that Congressional "policy cannot be defeated by the
Board's policy," Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 363 (1949),
and that the Board's charge is to enforce the fundamental objective of the
NLRA "to eliminate the 'inequality of bargaining power between employees...
and employers."' Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151). The
NLRB does not have expertise in national security issues, nor does it have
authority to sacrifice the Congressional objectives declared in the NLRA on the
basis of concerns over the obligations imposed on employers by other legal
obligations absent direct conflict. Even where there is a direct conflict between
the policies underlying the NLRA and those of another statute, the Board
should "'minimize [ ] the impact of its actions on the policies of the other
statute,'" but its primary obligation is still to "'fully enforce the requirements of
its own statute ... insofar as possible."' Can-Am Plumbing, Inc. v. NLRB, 321
F.3d 145, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting N.Y. Shipping Ass'n v. Fed. Mar.
Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
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ees, 1 the principal thesis of the Article is that the Board's reli-
13. Commentators have extensively debated the question whether the
NLRA mandates, permits, or prohibits extension of Weingarten rights to non-
union employees. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 9, at 182-83 (suggesting that
"[t]he statutory theory in Weingarten is that the individual's request for aid, in
seeking the protection of another against a perceived threat to employment
security, is concert of action and must be accommodated by the employer");
Sarah C. Flannery, Extending Weingarten to the Nonunion Setting, 49 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 163 (2001) (opposing Weingarten rights for non-unionized employees on
policy grounds); Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 211 (describing the 2001
NLRB decision to extend Weingarten rights to all employees as not only "mani-
festly correct," but "wise and good"); Ostmann, supra note 5 (extension of Wein-
garten rights to non-unionized employees unwarranted); Steve Carlin, Note,
Extending Weingarten Rights to Non-union Employees, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 618
(1986) (arguing that non-union workers are entitled to Weingarten rights pursu-
ant to Section 7 of the Act and that extension of these rights does not interfere
with the policies of Section 9(a)); Jill D. Flack, Note, Limiting the Weingarten
Right in the Non-union Setting: The Implication of Sears, Roebuck and Co., 35
CATH. U. L. REv. 1033, 1059 (1986) (criticizing the 1982 NLRB decision deny-
ing Weingarten rights to non-union employees on grounds that "[a] n employee's
request for the presence of a co-worker witness constitutes an attempt to engage
in concerted activity, albeit in its most formative stage"); Robyn Wilensky, Note,
Can I Get a Witness?: Extension of the Weingarten Right in the Non-Unionized Work-
place-Problems of Implementation Create Potential Harm for Both Employers and
Employees, 36 GA. L. REv. 315 (2001) (arguing against extension of Weingarten
rights to non-unionized workers on grounds of inadequate guidance with
respect to application).
Three different answers are possible to the question of whether or not
Weingarten rights are available to non-unionized employees. All three depend
in the first instance on statutory interpretation: (1) the NLRA, specifically Sec-
tion 7, mandates provision of Weingarten rights to all employees whether or not
they belong to unions; (2) the NLRA prohibits extension of Weingarten rights to
non-union employees either under all circumstances-because this aspect of
Section 7 applies only where employees have elected union representation and
because of the exclusivity provision of Section 9(a)-or at least where an
employee's request for the presence of a co-worker arises in isolation rather
than in the midst of other attempts by workers to engage in concerted activity,
see, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983),
discussed infra Part I.D; or (3) the availability of Weingarten rights to non-union
employees during any given time frame rests within the NLRB's discretionary
authority to interpret the NLRA. The Board has most often rested decisions
extending Weingarten rights on the third basis-that it has discretion to inter-
pret the NLRA to provide these rights to all workers-a construction arguably
validated by the Supreme Court's Weingarten decision, 420 U.S. at 266-67, and
affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Epilepsy
Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and Third Circuit,
Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 11, 12-13 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated, 733 F.2d 296 (3d
Cir. 1984). The Third Circuit specifically rejected the second proposition-
that the NLRA prohibits extension of Weingarten rights to non-union employ-
ees-in overturning a Board decision denying Weingarten rights to employees in
a non-unionized work force. Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
The court, however, subsequently upheld a supplemental decision reaching the
same result on the basis of the Board's discretionary authority to interpret the
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ance on the increasing frequency of workplace investigations,
corporate fiduciary lapses, terrorism, and workplace violence to
justify eliminating Weingarten rights for non-union employees
rests on faulty premises. There is no rational basis to suppose
that restricting the rights of line employees will minimize corpo-
rate financial debacles or prevent workplace violence, and the
notion that our nation's defense against terrorism depends on
the ability of private employers to interrogate non-union employ-
ees without a witness is patently absurd-particularly given the
Board's admission that these considerations are not weighty
enough to bar union representatives from investigative
interviews.
Moreover, while our times are indeed troubled, the Board
first established Weingarten rights in 1972 when the Vietnam War,
terrorism, significantly higher crime rates, and a host of other
problems rocked the country14-an era when antiwar protestors
seized the Statue of Liberty, the Weather Underground group
bombed the U.S. Capitol, and Black September terrorists mur-
dered eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games.15
There was no conceivable connection between Weingarten rights
and national security then, and there is none now. The Board's
IBM Corporation ruling reflects an ill-considered and dangerous
decision to restrict important safeguards in the name of
enhanced security-both physical and economic-without any
critical analysis of the legitimacy or efficacy of doing so. 6 If any-
NLRA. Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1986). Taken together,
Weingarten, Epilepsy Foundation, Slaughter, and Du Pont thus offer strong support
for the Board's assertion that it has broad discretion in this area. See generally
GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 7, at 17; Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 206-07.
From time to time, members of the NLRB have contended that an employee's
request for the presence of a co-worker representative in a disciplinary inter-
view falls outside the ambit of Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157. See, e.g., Materials
Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1018 (1982) (Van de Water, Chairman, dis-
senting), overruled in part by Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985);
IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 8-18 (Schaumber, Member, dissenting).
In several cases, however, even Board members who have ruled against exten-
sion of Weingarten rights to non-union employees have acknowledged that Sec-
tion 7 protects an employee's request for the presence of a co-worker. See IBM,
341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7 (Battista, Chairman & Meisburg, Member,
majority opinion); id. at 20 n.13 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 254-59.
16. A number of commentators have raised similar concerns about the
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (codified
in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 22, 28, 31, 42, 47, 49 & 50 U.S.C.), amended
by Pub. L. No. 109-160 (Dec. 30, 2005) and by Pub. L. No. 109-177 (Mar. 9,
2006), the most direct attempt to refashion various aspects of federal law to
address the threat of terrorism. Before passing the USA PATRIOT Act
20061
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thing, the relevant policy considerations support enhancement
rather than restriction of the safeguards afforded workers in
investigative interviews.
Part I of the following discussion begins with a brief history
of the development of the right of employees to co-worker repre-
sentation. Part II analyzes the Board's June 2004 decision to
withdraw Weingarten rights from non-union employees, and Part
III explores key policy factors relevant to recognition of an
employee's right to the presence of a co-worker in an investiga-
tive interview. Part IV argues that, rather than eliminating Wein-
garten rights for non-unionized workers, the NLRB should take
the next available opportunity to reaffirm and enhance these
safeguards.
I. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF WEINGARTEN RIGHTS
Like comets that travel through the solar system, Weingarten
rights for non-union employees tend to appear for brief inter-
ludes and then vanish. In their wake, they leave observers hope-
ful, but never certain, that they will reappear in the not-too-
distant future. In light of this history, before turning to the
Board's most recent ruling, it is helpful to review the evolution of
Weingarten rights and their application to union and non-union
workplaces. The following section briefly encapsulates relevant
developments, beginning with a summary of Weingarten and its
antecedents, and then presents highlights of the Board's ongo-
ing struggle to determine the rights of employees in investigative
interviews.' 7
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 in early March 2006, Congress
vigorously debated its merits. See, e.g., Charles Babbington, Aegotiations Stale-
mated Over Patriot Act, WASH. PosT, Jan. 25, 2006 (reporting on ongoing disa-
greement following Congressional action extending the sunset provision for
certain portions of the Act from December 31, 2005 until February 3, 2006);
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Renews Patriot Act Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at
AIO. For discussion of controversial aspects of the Act, see, e.g., DanielJ. Mitch-
ell, Fighting Terror and Defending Freedom: The Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 25 PACE
L. REV. 219 (2005); Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The
PATRIOT Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 319 (2005); Michael Traynor, Citizenship in a Time of
Repression, 2005 Wisc. L. REv. 1 (2005); Fernando A. Bohorquez, Jr., Challenges
to Challenging the PATRIOT Act: Limits on Judicial Review and a Proposal for Reform,
N.Y. ST. B. J., Feb. 2005, at 24. Whatever its flaws, however, the USA PATRIOT
Act at least represents a comprehensive attempt to address the threat of terror-
ism. In contrast, the NLRB's decision appears to be an ad hoc effort to join the
parade without a clear idea of the overall costs and benefits of restricting proce-
dural rights in the American workplace.
17. The interviews at issue with respect to Weingarten rights are described
as either "investigative" or "investigatory." This discussion utilizes the word
E W INGARTEN RIGHTS FOR NON-UNION EMPLOYEES
A. Early Board Decisions
Employees sought to obtain the right to union or co-worker
representation in investigative interviews as early as the 1940s, 8
and for many years the NLRB and several U.S. Courts of Appeals
struggled with the relevant analyses. 9 By 1972, however, the
Board had focused its attention specifically on Sections 7 and
8(a) (1) of the NLRA.2° In Quality Manufacturing Company2 and
Mobil Oil Corporation,22 cases involving union members who
sought to have their representatives present at investigative inter-
views, the Board viewed these requests as concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection within the meaning of Section 7.
21
"investigative," but the terms are intended to be interchangeable. Issues per-
taining to the existence and scope of Weingarten rights for union and non-union
employees have come before the Board, as well as the federal courts of appeals
in the context of petitions for review of NLRB decisions, on many occasions.
The following discussion focuses only on the most significant antecedents of
the Board's 2004 IBM Corporation decision. It is important to note that the
rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution are not available to private-sector
employees in the absence of state action. See, e.g., Coyne & Barker, supra note 7,
at 173-74; Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 206. See also infra note 235 and
accompanying text. Consequently, private-sector employees do not enjoy the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, or other constitutional
protections, absent state statutes providing specific rights as a matter of state
employment law. Id.
18. The NLRB first addressed the issue of representation in disciplinary
hearings in Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945), enforcement denied,
158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947). See David L. Gregory, The Employee's Right to Repre-
sentation During Employer Investigatory Interviews: A Clinical Analysis of the Evolution
of Weingarten Principles, 28 VILL. L. REv. 572 (1983); Beth Ann Sabbath, The
Right to Representation at Investigatory Interviews After Weingarten, 7J. CoRP. L. 851
(1982). For discussion of Ross and other relevant pre-1972 precedents, see
Gregory, supra, at 573-85; Sabbath, supra, at 852-54. See also Flack, supra note
13; Flannery, supra note 13, at 164; Heldman et al., supra note 9.
19. See Gregory, supra note 18, at 573-85.
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 158(a)(1) (2000). 29 U.S.C. § 157 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
Id. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), it is an unfair labor practice for employ-
ers "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157." See generally GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 7, at
402-06.
21. 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement granted in part, denied in part, 481
F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973), overruled by Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v.
Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
22. Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, Mobil
Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 158(a) (1).
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Consequently, the Board held that members of unionized
workforces have a right to the presence of a union representative
in investigative interviews that an employee reasonably believes
might lead to disciplinary sanctions. 24 This issue came before
the U.S. Supreme Court a few years later in Weingarten.25
B. Weingarten
1. The NLRB Ruling
Weingarten involved an unfair labor practice charge brought
by Leura Collins, a lunch stand employee who allegedly had
taken money from a cash register and paid too little for some
chicken nuggets at a lobby food counter operated by her
employer. 26 In the course of investigating the allegations, the
store manager and a company "loss prevention specialist" inter-
viewed Ms. Collins.27 At several points, Collins asked to have her
union shop steward present, but the manager refused her
requests. 28 After interrogating Collins, the interviewers deter-
mined that the allegations were unfounded and apologized for
inconveniencing her.29 A subsequent comment from a tearful
Collins, however, led to additional questioning and concomitant
problems, although the interview terminated without the imposi-
tion of any sanctions against her.3° The manager asked Collins
not to discuss the matter with anyone, but she reported what had
happened to her shop steward.3 The union subsequently filed
unfair labor practice charges on her behalf.3 2
24. Quality Mfg., 195 N.L.R.B. at 199; Mobil Oil, 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052-53.
25. NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 254 (1975). The NLRB's
decision is found at 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973).
26. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 254.
27. Id. at 254-55.
28. Id. at 254.
29. Id. at 255.
30. Id. When the interviewers told Collins that "the matter was closed,"
she "burst into tears and blurted out that the only thing she had ever gotten
from the store without paying for it was her free lunch." Id. at 254-55. Unfor-
tunately for Collins, while many J. Weingarten stores, including the one to
which she previously had been assigned, provided employees with free lunches,
the lobby lunch counter where she worked at the time of the interview did not
do so. Id. at 255. Predictably, the store manager and the loss prevention spe-
cialist proceeded to question Collins about the lunches she had obtained alleg-
edly in violation of company policy. They prepared a bill for one-hundred sixty
dollars and asked her to sign it, but Collins refused to do so. Subsequent
inquiries by the manager and investigator to corporate headquarters revealed
so much uncertainty about the free lunch policy that they decided not to pur-
sue the matter. Id.
31. Id. at 256.
32. Id. at 256 n.4.
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The NLRB ruled in Collins' favor, applying the standard
previously articulated in Quality Manufacturinge3 and Mobil Oil. 4
The Board, however, was careful to note the limitations on the
right to union representation in investigatory interviews: these
rights arise only in response to an employee's request; they are
limited to circumstances in which the employee's belief in the
possibility of disciplinary sanctions was reasonable; they do not
apply to "run-of-the mill shop-floor conversations-e.g., the giv-
ing of instructions or training or needed corrections of work
techniques";35 employers remain free to decline an employee's
request to have a union representative present and forego the
interview withoutjustifying their refusal;36 and there is no duty to
bargain with union representatives attending investigative inter-
views with employees.
Despite these limitations, J. Weingarten, Inc. found the deci-
sion unacceptable, and the NLRB filed a petition for enforce-
ment in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.38 The
Circuit Court declined to enforce the Board's order, holding
that the majority had improperly construed Section 7.39 The
Fifth Circuit panel recognized that Section 7 protects "concerted
activities" for the "mutual aid and protection" of all employees,
but it held these safeguards inapplicable to investigative inter-
views.4" The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari.4
33. Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement denied, 481 F.2d
1018 (4th Cir. 1973), overruled by Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Qual-
ity Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
34. Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), revd, 482 F.2d 842 (7th
Cir. 1973).
35. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256.
36. Id. It would then be the employee's decision whether to go forward
with the interview or await the employer's determination without presenting his
or her own position on the matter in question.
37. Id.
38. J. Weingarten, Inc. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973), overruled
by 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
39. Id. at 1138 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 847-48
(7th Cir. 1973) (denying enforcement of the NLRB order requiring employer
to afford Weingarten rights to non-union employees on grounds that "the novel
'right to representation' . . . is not a 'concerted activity' within the meaning of
the Act," or it "would have been recognized many years ago." (quoting NLRB v.
Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947); Texaco v. NLRB, 408 F.2d
142 (5th Cir. 1969)))).
40. Weingarten, 485 F.2d at 1138.
41. The Supreme Court subsequently noted that the question of the right
to the presence of a union representative at investigatory hearings the
employee reasonably believes might lead to disciplinary action was a recurring
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2. The Supreme Court's Decision
In Weingarten, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit
and upheld the Board's ruling.42 Four themes run through the
majority opinion: the objectives of the Act with respect to con-
certed action; the usefulness of assistance to individual employ-
ees summoned to investigative interviews they reasonably believe
may lead to disciplinary sanctions; the benefits of the presence of
union representatives at such interviews; and the deference due
the Board's interpretation of the NLRA. The Court also noted
the limitations inherent in the right to representation.43
Justice Brennan, writing for a six-member majority, began by
focusing on the purposes of the NLRA. He described the
Board's ruling as "plainly effectuat[ing] the most fundamental
purposes of the Act,"4 including the legislative objective of
"eliminat[ing] the 'inequality of bargaining power between
employees . . . and employers."' 45 The Court specifically deter-
mined that an individual employee's request for union represen-
tation in an investigative interview "clearly falls within the literal
wording of § 7 that '[e]mployees shall have the right . . . to
engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual
aid or protection.' "46 In contrast,
[r]equiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory
interview which he reasonably believes may result in the
imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act
was designed to eliminate, and bars recourse to the safe-
one, citing more than twenty other NLRB cases involving the same issue. 420
U.S. 251, 253 n.3 (1975).
42. Id. at 253.
43. See id. at 256-59. Later NLRB decisions have further clarified the
scope of Weingarten rights. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 7, at 406. Princi-
pally, Weingarten rights are available only with respect to interviews involving
development of facts related to discipline prior to the imposition of sanctions;
Weingarten rights may be waived in collective bargaining agreements; employers
have no duty to communicate the existence of Weingarten rights to their employ-
ees; and the representatives may speak, but may not disrupt the investigative
interview. Id. at 406, 528-29. Employees and their unions generally may
choose representatives and consult with their representatives prior to inter-
views. Id. at 528-29. See also, e.g., Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 205.
44. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 261.
45. Id. at 262 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
46. Id. at 260 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 847 (7th
Cir. 1973) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157)). This is true even though a particular
employee has a uniquely personal interest in her own position, because afford-
ing such a right "safeguard[s] not only the particular employee's interest, but
also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make
certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing
punishment unjustly." Id. at 260-61.
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guards the Act provided "to redress the perceived imbal-
ance of economic power between labor and
management.
4 7
The Court expressed concern that an employee confronted
alone by an employer might be "too fearful or inarticulate to
relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant
to raise extenuating factors."4 8 The opinion also emphasized the
importance of timing, observing that once an employer imposes
discipline "it becomes increasingly difficult for an employee to
vindicate himself, and the value of the representation is corre-
spondingly diminished.
49
If the Court had limited its analysis to the mutual aid and
protection language of Section 7, the course of future develop-
ments might have been less tortured. Justice Brennan, however,
also discussed the reasons why the presence of a union represen-
tative would be valuable for all concerned, making it unclear
whether the Court intended to limit its decision to union
employees or simply to focus on the precise issue before it.5" In
any event, the Court observed: "A knowledgeable union repre-
sentative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts,
and save the employer production time by getting to the bottom
of the incident occasioning the interview. "51
Finally, the Court specifically rejected J. Weingarten's argu-
ments that the NLRB's "earlier precedents . . .impair[ed] the
validity of the Board's construction. '52 Noting the Board's need
to shape standards pursuant to "an evolutionary process, '53 the
Court explained that "[t]he use by an administrative agency of
the evolutional approach is particularly fitting. . . . 'Cumulative
experience' begets understanding and insight... by which judg-
47. Id. at 262 (quoting Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316
(1965)).
48. Id. at 262-63.
49. Id. at 263-64. The Court rejected the company's argument that
"union representation at this stage is unnecessary" because inappropriate disci-
plinary action could be corrected after the decision to impose discipline had
become final. The Court reasoned that following the imposition of sanctions,
"[t] he employer may then be more concerned with justifying his actions than
re-examining them." Id. at 263-64.
50. Justice Powell, however, concluded that the Court's analysis necessa-
rily extended to non-unionized as well as unionized workplaces. See id. at 270
n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting) and infra text accompanying notes 60-62.
51. Id. at 263.
52. Id. at 264.
53. Id. at 265.
2006]
668 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
ments are validated or qualified or invalidated."54 The Court
emphasized the judicial deference due to the NLRB:
The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of
industrial life is entrusted to the Board.... It is the prov-
ince of the Board, not the courts, to determine whether or
not the "need" exists in light of changing industrial prac-
tices and the Board's cumulative experience in dealing
with labor-management relations.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that "the Board's recognition
that Section 7 guarantees an employee's right to the presence of
a union representative in an investigative interview in which the
risk of discipline reasonably inheres is within the protective
ambit of the section 'read in the light of the mischief to be cor-
rected and the end to be attained."'
56
While the Court did not clarify whether a contrary ruling
would have been inconsistent with the rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7, Justice Brennan observed that the Board's decision was
"in full harmony with actual industrial practice. 57 On behalf of
the Court, he emphasized the judicial deference owed to the
Board in this context:
[T]he Board's construction .... while it may not be
required by the Act, is at least permissible under it, and,
insofar as the Board's application of that meaning engages
in the "difficult and delicate responsibility" of reconciling
conflicting interests of labor and management, the balance
struck by the Board is "subject to limited judicial review."58
Chief Justice Burger dissented from the Court's decision,
stating that the appropriate resolution would have been a
remand to the NLRB because of the Agency's failure to provide
the explanation necessitated by "[t]he tortured history and
inconsistency of the Board's efforts in this difficult area. ' 59 Jus-
tice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented on substantive
grounds. He contended that "[t]he type of personalized inter-
view with which we are here concerned is simply not 'concerted
54. Id. at 265-66 (quoting NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349
(1953) (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941))).
55. Id. at 266.
56. Id. at 262.
57. Id. at 267. The Court noted that "a 'well-established current of arbi-
tral authority' sustains the right of union representation at investigatory inter-
views which the employee reasonably believes may result in disciplinary action
against him." Id.
58. Id. at 266-67.
59. Id. at 269.
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activity' within the meaning of the Act."'6° To Justice Powell,
"[t]he power to discipline or discharge employees has been rec-
ognized uniformly as one of the elemental prerogatives of man-
agement."'" Lamenting the Court's incursion on managerial
prerogatives, Justice Powell observed: "While the Court speaks
only of the right to insist on the presence of a union representa-
tive, it must be assumed that the § 7 right today recognized,
affording employees the right to act 'in concert' in employer
interviews, also exists in the absence of a recognized union."62 A few
years after Justice Stewart wrote these words, the NLRB con-
firmed that Weingarten did indeed extend to employees in non-
unionized workplaces.
C. Materials Research Corporation
The dispute at issue in Materials Research Corporation6" arose
out of the efforts of several staff members led by employee Steve
Hochman to discuss an order for immediate implementation of a
new work schedule with Material Research Corporation's man-
agement. After an abortive effort by Hochman and two other
employees to discuss the changes with supervisory personnel,64
Hochman's supervisor admonished him that he had no right to
convene an employee gathering.65 Later that same day, the
supervisor summoned Hochman, informed him that the encoun-
ter constituted "a disciplinary hearing," and delivered, memorial-
ized, and placed in Hochman's file a verbal warning
admonishing him for his conduct.6 6 On each occasion, Hoch-
man asked the supervisor to permit a co-worker to join them, but
the supervisor denied his requests.6 7
Hochman subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging that his employer had violated Section 8(a) (1) of the
NLRA by refusing to permit him to have a co-worker present dur-
60. Id. at 275.
61. Id. at 273. Given the restricted nature of Weingarten rights, however,
"employer prerogative determines whether Weingarten rights will be extended to
the employee. Thus, the Weingarten right is not guaranteed in all circum-
stances; rather it is a conditional privilege subject to the employer's consent."
Flack, supra note 13, at 1055 (footnotes omitted). Exercise of the right requires
an employee to request a representative. In response an employer may grant
the request or proceed without a hearing. Id.
62. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 269 n.1 (emphasis added).
63. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982), overruled in part by Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
64. Id. at 1010.
65. Id. at 1011.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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ing an investigatory interview that he reasonably believed could
lead to disciplinary action."8 A divided Board ruled for Hoch-
man, overturning an administrative law judge's decision in favor
of the company.69 Concluding that Weingarten rights arise from
the safeguard provided by Section 7 protecting concerted activity
for mutual aid and protection, rather than the exclusive repre-
sentation rights of unions found in Section 9(a), the majority
reasoned that it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme
of the NLRA to restrict Weingarten rights to employees repre-
sented by unions.70 The majority explained that the Weingarten
Court focused on the rights of union employees because of the
fact pattern presented by the case, "not because the Court
intended to limit the right recognized in Weingarten only to
unionized employees."
7 1
The Board emphasized that "Section 7 rights are enjoyed by
all employees and are in no wise dependent on union represen-
tation for their implementation,"72 stressing that:
the need of unrepresented employees to support each
other through this type of conduct may well be greater
than that of represented employees. Unrepresented
employees normally do not have the benefit of a collective-
bargaining agreement which serves as a check on an
employer's ability to act unjustly or arbitrarily. Nor do they
68. Id. at 1010. For the text of Section 8(a)(1), see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1)
(2000), excerpted in pertinent part in supra note 20.
69. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1010. The administrative law
judge's decision is set forth in the appendix to the NLRB decision. Id. at 1022.
70. Id. at 1010. The text of Section 9(a) is set forth infra note 104.
71. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012. The majority further
observed that "the Court carefully differentiated the role assigned to a 'repre-
sentative' at an investigatory interview from that of a collective-bargaining rep-
resentative acting in its representative capacity," noting that the role of a
representative in an investigative interview is primarily one of assisting the
employee, clarifying facts, or suggesting other sources of pertinent knowledge.
Id. The majority declared that by 1982 it had become "axiomatic that, with only
very limited exceptions, the protection afforded by Section 7 does not vary
depending on whether or not the employees involved are represented by a
union, or whether the conduct involved is related, directly or indirectly, to
union activity or collective bargaining." Id.
72. Id. at 1013. In the majority's view, to hold otherwise would be "to
interpret Section 7 in a manner which is clearly restrictive of its broad scope or
does violence to its purposes." Id. The majority's conclusion that "the rationale
enunciated in Weingarten compels the conclusion that unrepresented employ-
ees are entitled to the presence of a co-worker at an investigatory interview," id.
at 1014, accords with the viewJustice Powell expressed in his Weingarten dissent:
"it must be assumed that the § 7 right today recognized, affording employees
the right to act 'in concert' in employee interviews, also exists in the absence of
a recognized union." 420 U.S. at 270 n.1.
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usually have the protection of a grievance-arbitration pro-
cedure to police the terms of such an agreement ...
Indeed, when confronted with the prospect of an investigatory
interview which might result in discipline, the only assistance read-
ily available to an unrepresented employee lies in fellow employees,
and an employee attempt to enlist that type of protection is precisely
what the Act is designed to safeguard.7 3
Reasoning that "the Court's primary concern was the right of
employees to have some measure of protection against unjust
employer practices,"7 4 the majority explained that "[s] ince a pur-
pose underlying Weingarten is to prevent an employer from over-
powering a lone employee, the presence of a co-worker, even if that
individual does nothing more than act as a witness, still effectuates that
purpose, just as the presence of a union representative."7 5
Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter each filed sep-
arate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part from the
Board's decision. The gravamen of Chairman Van de Water's
opinion, as described by the majority, was that Weingarten rights
attach only in unionized workplaces, because Section 7 rights in
this context are available only where there is a collective bargain-
ing agreement to define the relationship between management
and employees. 76 The Chairman traced the development of the
principle, concluding that "the existence of an established collec-
tive-bargaining relationship and the statutory obligations which
arise therefrom were central to the definition and scope of an
employee's right to representation. '77 Despite the Supreme
Court's focus on Section 7 in Weingarten, to Chairman Van de
Water, in the absence of a recognized union, extension of Wein-
garten rights would violate Section 9(a).78
73. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1014 (citing Glomac Plastics,
Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311 (1978)) (emphasis added).
74. Id. See also NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (holding
Section 7 rights applicable to both unionized and non-unionized employees).
75. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 1015-16. The majority reiterated, however, that:
[A]n employer retains broad prerogatives when faced with an
employee's request for assistance at an investigatory interview ...
There is no obligation to accede to such a request, and an employer is
free to carry on its inquiry without interviewing the employee, leaving
the employee the choice between having an interview unassisted, or
having no interview and foregoing any benefits that might be derived
from one ....
Id. at 1015-16. The employer also remains free to act on the basis of the other
information it gathers. Id.
77. Id. at 1018.
78. Id.
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In a similar vein, Member Hunter opined that:
[T] he holding in Weingarten is rather clearly grounded in
the Supreme Court's recognition of the unique right and
obligation of the collective-bargaining representative in
terms of protecting the interests not only of the particular
individual or individuals called to an investigative inter-
view, but also of all the members of the unit.7 9
He characterized the extension of Weingarten rights to unrepre-
sented employees as one of a number of "expansionist Board
decisions" transforming investigative interviews into "formalized
adversary proceeding[s]."'8
D. Du Pont, Sears, and Slaughter
Shortly after Materials Research Corporation, E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours, Inc., became involved in two legal battles over the
company's obligation to afford Weingarten rights to employees in
non-unionized facilities. Resolution of these matters required
five NLRB rulings and four federal appellate court decisions.
1. The Ninth Circuit Case
The first of the two Du Pont company disputes to reach a
federal appellate court involved Henry Burke, an employee with
a troubled job history.8" Du Pont terminated Burke after he
refused to sign documents memorializing his performance defi-
ciencies and a related development plan without a co-worker as a
witness.8 2 Burke filed unfair labor charges against the company,
and the Board ruled in his favor on the basis of the principles
articulated in Materials Research Corporation.8 3
Du Pont petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review of the
Board's order. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and
denied enforcement.8 4 Although, as the Third Circuit later
observed, it was not at all clear that Burke's request to have a co-
worker witness his signing of the deficiency statement and devel-
79. Id. at 1021 (Hunter, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
80. Id. He further described the Board's ruling as opening a Pandora's
box in a manner the Supreme Court could not have intended. Id.
81. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.
1983).
82. Id. at 1077.
83. The Board issued a cease-and-desist order to Du Pont and instructed
the company to reinstate Burke with back pay. Id.
84. Id. at 1080.
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opment plan constituted an investigative interview,8 5 the Ninth
Circuit panel, like the NLRB, analyzed the matter in terms of the
Supreme Court's Weingarten decision. In so doing, the court
focused solely on the nature of "concerted activities" protected
by Section 7.s6 The opinion observed that Weingarten "assumed
without discussion that a request invoking union assistance is
concerted activity,"'17 and that Leura Collins' representation
request "partook of the concertedness inherent in union activ-
ity.""8 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit concluded that in Burke's
case there were no indicia of concerted activity within the mean-
ing of Section 7, and therefore no basis for his claim of entitle-
ment to Weingarten rights. The court, however, took pains to
note:
[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that a request for a
fellow employee may be found concerted in the non-union
setting. Section 7 applies to non-union employees as well
as union employees .... and unionization is not the only
sure indicator of concertedness. There must, however, be a
showing that the requesting employee acts as part of a
group.
89
The opinion also emphasized that the court did not
"embrace Du Pont's view that a coemployee might not at times
85. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v. NLRB (Du Pont
I), 724 F.2d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984).
Some commentators, however, refer to the Ninth Circuit decision as "Du Pont
I" and the first Third Circuit decision as "Du Pont II." To avoid confusion, this
article refers to the opinion published at 707 F.2d 1076 as the "Ninth Circuit
decision" and follows the Third Circuit's nomenclature with respect to that
court's three decisions in the Du Pont Chestnut Run matter.
86. Du Pont, 707 F.2d at 1076 n.1.
87. Id. at 1078. Four of the five IBM board members acknowledged that
the request of an individual employee for the assistance of a co-worker or union
representative at an investigative interview constitutes concerted activity pro-
tected by Section 7. See IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 1-8 (June
9, 2004); id. at 18-24 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting); Holling Press,
Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. No. 45, slip op. at 4-6 (Oct. 15, 2004) (Liebman, Member,
dissenting).
88. Du Pont, 707 F.2d at 1078.
89. Id. at 1079. The general rule is that individual actions designed to
induce group action constitute concerted activities. See, e.g., Meyers Ind. (Mey-
ers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985), reaffd., Meyers Ind. (Meyers
II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enfd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
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be as capable of providing assistance as a union representative,""
or accept Du Pont's "management prerogative arguments. " "
2. The Third Circuit Proceedings
The second Du Pont matter involved a dispute at the com-
pany's non-unionized Chestnut Run, Pennsylvania facility. Du
Pont had discharged employee Walter Slaughter for refusing to
submit to an investigative interview without a co-worker pre-
sent.9 2 The issue that triggered the dispute arose when Slaughter
posted an NLRB notice without obtaining prior approval of the
posting as required by company policy.9" Keeping track of the
subsequent proceedings-a microcosm of the Board's overall
treatment of the issue-is a bit like watching a ping-pong match.
a. Round One: The Initial NLRB and Third Circuit Decisions
In its first decision in the Slaughter/Du Pont matter, the
Board applied its Materials Research Corporation analysis to hold
that Section 7 of the Act protected Slaughter's refusal to submit
to an interview without the presence of a co-worker.94 Du Pont
filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, and in Du Pont I, an appellate panel upheld the
Board's decision on grounds that the extension of Weingarten
rights to non-union employees was permissible, albeit not
required, by the NLRA.95 Du Pont then petitioned for rehearing
and rehearing en banc.9 6 Before the court ruled on the petition,
however, the Board moved to vacate Du Pont I and requested the
court to remand the case for consideration along with another
matter then before the Board involving Sears, Roebuck and
Company.9 7 The Third Circuit acceded to the Board's request in
90. Du Pont, 707 F.2d at 1079.
91. Id. Concern over infringement of management prerogatives was one
of the principal bases on which Justices Powell and Stewart dissented from the
Court's decision in Weingarten. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251,
273-74 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes
60-62.
92. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v. NLRB (Du Pont
1), 724 F.2d 1061, 1063-64 (3d Cir. 1983).
93. Id.
94. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 262 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1982).
95. Du Pont 1, 724 F.2d at 1063.
96. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v. NLRB (Du Pont
II), 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984). See supra note 83.
97. Id. at 296.
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Du Pont Ion the basis "of the deference owed the Board's special
expertise in interpreting the Act."9 8
b. Round Two: Sears and the NLRB's First Supplemental Decision
in Slaughter
Before the Board returned to Slaughter's claims, it decided
Sears, Roebuck and Company.9 9 In Sears, Roebuck and Company, a
dispute involving a request for co-worker representation by an
employee who had been accused of falsifying company
records,1 00 the Board reexamined the statutory bases for its ear-
lier holdings and determined that the NLRA did not support the
provision of Weingarten rights to non-unionized employees after
all. The Board now concluded that the Act prohibited the exten-
sion of this procedural protection.' l In reaching its decision, the
Board incorporated and expanded on the analysis of Chairman
Van de Water's dissent in Materials Research Corporation.10 2 First,
the Board stated that Weingarten rested in part on the right of
organized employees not to deal with employers individually with
respect to terms and conditions of employment. 1' Second, the
Board determined that interpreting Section 7 as an independent
source of a right to co-worker representation would conflict with
the exclusivity principle set forth in Section 9(a) of the NLRA.'0 4
98. Id. at 297-98. In the appellate court's view, the best exercise of its
discretion was to "postpon [e] further judicial involvement until we have been
informed of a comprehensive adjudication by the NLRB." Id. at 298.
99. Du Pont I, 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
100. Id. at 240.
101. Id. at 231.
102. Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1986). See supra text
accompanying notes 74-76.
103. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 231 (1985). In the view of
Matthew Finkin,
[this] entire argument rests upon a non sequitur . . . if, as the
Supreme Court held [in Weingarten], the employer has no statutory
duty to bargain with the Weingarten representative, the function of
that representative in the unorganized setting cannot be in derogation
of the exclusivity principle or any other important statutory policy.
Finkin, supra note 9, at 182. In Finkin's view, "The statutory theory in Wein-
garten is that the individual's request for aid, in seeking the protection of
another against a perceived threat to employment security, is a concert of
action and must be accommodated by the employer" pursuant to Section 7 of
the NLRA. Id. at 182-83.
104. Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employ-
ees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
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In arriving at these conclusions, the majority reasoned that the
employer would have a duty "to deal" with a co-worker represen-
tative in some circumstances-for example, with respect to pro-
posals of alternative sanctions in cases in which management
decided to discipline the interviewee. According to the majority,
this kind of exchange "is a primary indicium of labor organiza-
tion status as well as a traditional union function" and therefore
requires the employer "to recognize and deal with the equivalent
of a union representative." 105 The Board therefore determined
"that the Act compels the conclusion that non-union employees do
not enjoy the rights recognized in the Weingarten decision."106
Applying this analysis, the Board held Weingarten inapplicable in
the absence of representation by a certified union.10 7
Member Hunter agreed with the majority, but he found the
extension of Weingarten rights to non-unionized employees to be
"unwarranted and unwise,"10 8 rather than prohibited by the
NLRA.' °9 He reasoned that employees who have not elected
union representation should not be entitled to co-worker repre-
sentation, and he opined that co-workers had neither the skills
nor the emotional distance necessary to serve successfully as rep-
resentatives for their peers." 0
On the basis of Sears, Roebuck and Company, the Board issued
a supplemental order reversing its earlier determination in Du
Pont.11' Slaughter petitioned for review of the Board's supple-
mental order, and the Third Circuit overturned the Board's new
ruling in Du Pont II.12 Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge
Leon Higginbotham stated: "Because we adhere to this Court's
earlier view, stated in DuPont I, that Materials Research Corporation
represented a permissible interpretation of the Act, we cannot
employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining con-
tract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
105. Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 232.
106. Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 122 (citing 274 N.L.R.B. at 230 n.5).
107. Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 232.
108. Id. at 234.
109. Id. at 232-34 (Hunter, Member, concurring).
110. Id.
111. Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. 1104.
112. Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
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sustain the Board's action. ' " In reaching its decision, the Third
Circuit relied on Weingarten and reiterated the Du Pont I panel's
conclusion "that 'the logic and reasoning of Weingarten carry
equal force in the non-union context.' "114 As a matter of law,
the court specifically rejected the Board's contention "that § 7
rights are circumscribed by § 9(a),"' 15 as well as its position that
the extension of the Weingarten right to non-union employees
"conflicts with § 9(a)'s exclusivity principle." '116 Concluding that
the Board's decision rested on "an unsustainable reason,"'1 17 the
Third Circuit panel granted the petition and remanded the case
to the NLRB for further proceedings.'
1 8
c. Round Three: The Board's Second Supplemental Decision
In its Second Supplemental Decision,11 after reviewing the
checkered history of its own precedent and related judicial deci-
sions, 12 the Board endorsed its most recent preceding resolu-
tion of the dispute, albeit on different grounds.' 2 ' This time, the
113. Id. at 122. The court noted that "if we are to sustain the Board's
action, it must be on the basis that no other interpretation of the Act is permis-
sible, regardless of whether their order could be sustained on other grounds."
Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87, 95 (1943); KENNETH CULP
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 14.29 (2d ed. 1980)).
114. Id. at 124 (quoting E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run)
v. NLRB (Du Pont 1), 724 F.2d 1061, 1065 (3d Cir. 1983)). The court noted the
Board's own prior declaration "that non-union employees may have an even
greater need for Weingarten representation than union employees, since they do
not normally have the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement or estab-
lished grievance procedures," id. at 124 (citing Materials Research Corp., 262
N.L.R.B. 1010, 1014 (1982) (emphasis in original)), as well as its recognition
that co-workers, like union representatives, could substantially assist an
employee in an investigative interview. Id.
115. Id. at 127.
116. Id. The court noted that it had "no occasion to consider ... whether
the interpretation of the Act announced in Sears is a permissible one, or
whether the Board's action might be sustained on that alternative ground." Id.
117. Id. at 128 (quoting HenryJ. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on
Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DuKE L.J. 199, 222).
118. Id. at 128.
119. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. 627 (1988).
120. Id
121. In its Second Supplemental Decision, the Board emphasized the
Weingarten Court's recognition that the Board is free to reexamine past con-
structions of the Act, noting that it is in "the nature of administrative decision-
making to proceed through a gradual process, based on 'cumulative experi-
ence' and 'trial and error' in construing and applying the Act." Id. at 628
(quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1975)). The
Board also cited the Court's acknowledgment that the Board has ongoing
responsibility for the "difficult task of 'reconciling conflicting interests of labor
and management.'" Id. (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 267).
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majority emphasized that "we are more assured of striking 'a fair
and reasoned balance' between the conflicting interests [of labor
and management] by not imposing the constraints on investiga-
tory interviews that recognition of 'the Weingarten right'
entails. ' 12 2 Applying this reasoning, the Board concluded that
"an employee in a non-unionized workplace does not possess a
right under Section 7 to insist on the presence of a fellow
employee in an investigatory interview by the employer's repre-
sentatives, even if the employee reasonably believes that the
interview may lead to discipline."12
In support of its decision, the Board harkened back to many
of the arguments offered by Chairman Van de Water and Mem-
ber Hunter in Materials Research Corporation.'24 and adopted by
the Board in Sears, Roebuck and Company.'2 5 The majority reiter-
ated earlier rationales for differentiating between union and
non-union employees with respect to the right to assistance dur-
ing an investigative interview and raised the concern that affirma-
tion of Weingarten rights for non-unionized workers might cause
employers to dispense with hearings entirely.' 26 The Board, how-
ever, acknowledged:
[T]here is no denying that an employee in a workplace
without union representation might welcome the support
of a fellow employee at an interview he or she fears will
lead to discipline and no denying that, in some circum-
stances, the presence of such a person might aid the
employee or both the employee and the employer.' 27
Nevertheless, the ultimate decision rested on the conclusion that
factors mitigating in favor of "such representation under Section
7 are less numerous and less weighty than the interests apparent
in the union setting."128 Consequently, the Board concluded
"that the interests of both labor and management are better
served by declining to extend this right into that forum."' 29
3. Match Point: The Third Circuit's Enforcement Decision
Following the Board's Second Supplemental Decision,
Slaughter once again petitioned the Third Circuit for review.
This time, however, the court denied his petition and enforced
122. Id. (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 267).
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 76-80.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
126. Du Pont, 289 N.L.R.B. at 628.
127. Id. at 630.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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the Board's order.13 In an accompanying per curiam opinion, a
new Third Circuit panel identified the issue then before it as the
reasonableness of the Board's construction of Section 7. 31 The
court stated:
The scope of our review over permissible Board construc-
tions of the Act is highly deferential. The Board, with its
considerable expertise in labor relations, is better
equipped than this Court to determine what reasonable
interpretation of § 7 of the Act will best promote its pur-
pose of insuring employees' rights to joint action and col-
lective bargaining, as well as that of promoting industrial
peace.
132
As a result, only union members enjoyed Weingarten rights for the
next several years.
E. Epilepsy Foundation
In 2000, however, the Board again reversed course in its
decision in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio.'3 3 Epilepsy Foun-
dation involved two health care workers, Ashraful Hasan and
Amis Borgs, who had expressed significant differences with their
supervisor and written memoranda seeking to dispense with his
supervisory authority over their cases. 3 The Epilepsy Founda-
tion terminated the men after each refused to participate in
investigative interviews without a co-worker present. 13 5 Their
entitlement to co-worker representation was one of a number of
issues raised before the NLRB.
The Board once again began its analysis of the co-worker
representation issue with the Supreme Court's decision in Wein-
130. Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989).
131. Id. at 12-13.
132. Id. at 13. The court explained:
Other conclusions may be possible, perhaps even reasonable. How-
ever, the Board is the authoritative expert on what will best further the
purpose of § 7 of the Act. It has decided against Slaughter on a rea-
sonable interpretation of the Act and we must defer to its judgment in
that respect.
Id.; see also id. at 13 n.4 ("We do not sit to substitute our wisdom on the subject
of labor relations for that of the Board, . . . nor to ensure 'academic consis-
tency' in its interpretation of the Act." (quoting Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d
120, at 124-25 (3d Cir. 1986))); id. at 13 n.3 ("It is the Board's duty to choose
amongst permissible interpretations of the Act to best effectuate its overarching
goals." (quoting Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 125)).
133. 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000), review granted in part, rev'd in part and
enforced, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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garten. The majority concluded that, read together, the Court's
key pronouncements "explain that the right to the presence of a
representative is grounded in the rationale that the Act generally
affords employees the opportunity to act together to address the
issue of an employer's practice of imposing unjust punishment
on employees." '136 Finding no evidence that reviving Weingarten
rights for non-union employees would "wreak havoc"' 37 with
NLRA provisions applicable to dealings between employers and
non-union employees, the majority stressed that "the right to
have a co-worker present at the investigatory interview affords
unrepresented employees the opportunity to act in concert to
prevent a practice of unjust punishment." '38 Accordingly, the
Board held that the Epilepsy Foundation had "violated Section
8(a) (1) of the Act by terminating Borgs for insisting on having
his co-worker, Hasan, present at an investigatory interview. "139
The Board then determined to apply its Section 8(a) (1) ruling
retroactively.' 40
Members Hurtgen and Brame concurred in portions of the
Board's decision but dissented from the recognition of Wein-
garten rights for non-union employees. Member Hurtgen
focused in particular on the absence of a bargaining unit and the
concomitant lack of a union representative in non-unionized
workplaces.14 1 On this basis, he concluded that the reasoning of
Weingarten did not apply in the absence of a duly authorized
union, 14 2 although he indicated that employees could not be
sanctioned simply for requesting representatives. 43 Member
Brame echoed arguments raised nearly a decade earlier by Chair-
man Van de Water in his dissent in Materials Research Corpora-
136. Id. at 677. The Board also noted that in Du Pont, its predecessors
had "acknowledged that 'the statute might be amenable to other interpreta-
tions,"' id. (quoting E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B 627, 628 (1988)),
and that the earlier Board had "specifically disavowed Sears insofar as it held the
Act compels a finding that Weingarten rights are applicable only in unionized
workplaces." Id. (citing Du Pont, 289 N.L.R.B. at 628 n.8).
137. Id. at 678.
138. Id. Like the Third Circuit in Du Pont III, the Board dismissed the
dissent's characterization of the right of non-union employees to the presence
of a co-worker in an investigative interview as forcing an employer "to 'deal
with' the equivalent of a labor organization" in conflict with Section 9(a) as a
"non sequitur." Id. (quoting Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120, 127 (3d Cir.
1986)). See also Finkin, supra note 9, at 183-85.
139. Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 679 (2000).
140. Id. at 679-80.
141. Id. at 682-84 (Hurtgen, Member, dissenting in part).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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tion,' further elaborating on the significance of the absence of
a recognized union to employees who were not union mem-
bers. 145 He also raised concerns about the competency of co-
worker representatives, as well as the possibility that an employee
might choose a co-worker representative already involved in a
particular dispute.1
46
The case subsequently came before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, pursuant to the Epilepsy Founda-
tion's petition for review.14 7 Chief Judge Harry Edwards, writing
for a unanimous panel, upheld the Board's ruling with respect to
extension of Weingarten protections to non-union workers. 148
Although the court overturned the Board's retroactive applica-
tion of the new rule, as well as some of its evidentiary findings on
another aspect of the case, 149 it upheld the decision to revive
Weingarten rights for future employee disputes as "a reasonable
reading of § 7 of the NLRA ... entitled to deference." 5 ' Refus-
ing to accept the Epilepsy Foundation's argument that the Board
was bound by its own prior precedent, Judge Edwards succinctly
summarized the political reality: "It is a fact of life in NLRB lore
that certain substantive provisions of the NLRA invariably fluctu-
ate with the changing compositions of the Board."''
In reaching its decision, the D.C. Circuit panel rejected the
notion that "an unrepresented employee cannot invoke any collec-
tive rights of the sort found in a unionized workplace" '152 as a
"terribly shortsighted" understanding of concerted activity.153
The court found the NLRB's position reasonable, opining:
144. See id. at 685-98 (Brame, Member, dissenting in part).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
148. Id. at 1100-02.
149. Id. at 1102-03.
150. Id. at 1097. The court specifically rejected the Epilepsy Founda-
tion's contention that the decision was legally infirm because the Board gives
renewed, rather than new, meaning to a disputed statutory provision. Id. The
Board's conclusion obviously is debatable (because the Board has 'changed its
mind' several times in addressing this issue); but the rationale underlying the
decision in this case is both clear and reasonable. That is all that is necessary to
garner deference from the court. "When a challenge to an agency construction
of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of
the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap
left open by Congress, the challenge must fail." Id. at 1102 (quoting Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)).
151. Id. at 1097.
152. Id. at 1100.
153. Id.
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[T] he presence of a co-worker gives an employee a poten-
tial witness, advisor, and advocate in an adversarial situa-
tion, and, ideally, militates against the imposition of unjust
discipline by the employer. The Board's position also recog-
nizes that even non-union employees may have a shared interest in
preventing the impositions of unjust punishment, and an
employee's assertion of Weingarten invokes this shared interest.
The Board's determination that an employee's request for
a co-worker's presence at an investigatory interview is con-
certed action for mutual aid and protection and thus
within the realm of § 7 is therefore reasonable.1"4
Accordingly, the court upheld the reincarnation of Weingarten
rights for non-union employees, although it rejected the Board's
decision to apply its ruling retroactively.
155
II. IBM CORPORATION: THE BOARD'S MOST RECENT
COURSE REVERSAL
In 2004, the Board once again abandoned its support of
Weingarten rights for non-union employees. A dispute between
IBM Corporation and three of its employees provided the vehicle
for the Board to revisit the issue.1 56
A. Background
The circumstances that brought IBM and its former employ-
ees before the NLRB arose following the company's receipt of a
letter from an attorney representing a contract worker who had
provided services to the company. The letter accused IBM
employees Kevin Schult and Steven Parsley of harassment and
mentioned the name of a third employee-Robert Bannon-in
connection with the alleged misconduct.1 57 Following separate
initial interviews of the men, the company's principal investigator
summoned each employee to a second interview. Although all
154. Id. (emphasis added). The court also agreed with the majority's
rejection of the argument advanced by Member Brame and the Epilepsy Foun-
dation that extending Weingarten to non-union employees effectively forces a
non-unionized employer "to deal with the equivalent of a labor organization."
Id. at 1101 (quoting Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, 679
(2000)). Citing the Board's characterization of the logic of the position as
"strained," because "[t]he employer is completely free to forego the investiga-
tory interview and pursue other means of resolving the matter," id. at 1101
(quoting Epilepsy Found., 331 N.L.R.B. at 679) the court observed, "[t]here is
nothing more to be said on this matter, for the Board decision says it all." Id.
155. Id.
156. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (June 9, 2004).
157. Id., slip op. at 24-25.
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three asked to have an attorney or co-worker present during the
interview, the investigator refused their requests. 158 Each was ter-
minated 159 and subsequently joined in filing a complaint alleging
that IBM had violated Section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA by denying
their requests for co-worker representation.16 The Administra-
tive Law Judge (ALJ) who heard the case found in favor of the
employees, ruling that IBM had engaged in unfair labor practices
in violation of the NLRA."l IBM appealed the ALJ's ruling to
the NLRB, successfully "urg[ing] the Board to overrule Epilepsy
Foundation and return to the principles of E.I. Du Pont & Co."162
B. The IBM Corporation Majority and Concurrence
1. The Majority Opinion
Chairman Battista and Members Meisburg and Schaumber
formed the Board majority in IBM Corporation, with the Chair-
man and Member Meisburgjoining in the principal opinion.' 63
Member Schaumber expressed agreement with the policy analy-
sis set forth in their opinion and also wrote a separate concurring
opinion.164 The majority opinion began by characterizing the
issue at stake as a choice between two permissible interpretations
of the NLRA. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Weingarten
and the Third Circuit's ruling in Slaughter v. NLRB,'65 Chairman
Battista and Member Meisburg concluded:
Because there is Board precedent in this area presenting
two permissible interpretations of the statute, the decision
as to which approach to follow is a matter of policy for the
158. Id.
159. Their terminations became final following unsuccessful internal
appeals. Id.
160. Id., slip op. at 24.
161. Id.
162. Id., slip op. at 1.
163. Id. Member Schaumberg joined in holding Weingarten rights
unavailable to employees in non-union workplaces and "fully concur[red] ...
in finding that the policy considerations advanced in the majority decision sup-
port[ed] such a limitation." Id., slip op. at 8 (Schaumberg, Member, concur-
ring). He wrote separately to explain his position with respect to the relevance
of Section 9(a) of the NLRA. Id. As in the concurring opinion of Member
Schaumber and the dissenting opinion of Members Liebman and Walsh, here-
inafter the Battista-Meisburg opinion is referred to as "the majority."
164. Id., slip op. at 8.
165. Id., slip op. at 2 (citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251
(1975); Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986)). The majority focused
on the Third Circuit's holding that "the refusal to extend Weingarten to the non-
unionized workplace was a permissible interpretation of the Act," although it
also acknowledged Epilepsy Foundation's extension of those rights to non-union-
ized workforces as permissible. Id., slip op. at 2.
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Board to decide in its discretion. "It is the Board's duty to
choose amongst permissible interpretations of the Act to
best effectuate its overarching goals."
' 6 6
On the basis of this foundation and their summary of the
relevant precedents, the majority proceeded to identify and eval-
uate the policy considerations they deemed relevant, framing
their discussion in terms of escalating requirements for investiga-
tory interviews, the events of September 11, 2001, corporate fidu-
ciary lapses, and purported increases in workplace violence.
167
Concluding that "policy considerations . . . [earlier articulated]
in DuPont have taken on a new vitality"' 68 because of these devel-
opments, the majority returned to the same issues debated in
Board precedents spanning three decades. In so doing, Chair-
man Battista and Member Meisburg identified four principal dif-
ferences between union representatives and employees in non-
union workplaces. First, in the majority's view, co-workers,
unlike union representatives, have no duty of fair representation,
are not designated group representatives, and have neither the
same legal obligations nor the personal incentives as union rep-
resentatives. 6 9 Second, co-workers lack the resources and rela-
tionships necessary to minimize power imbalances between
employers and employees.17 ° Third, co-workers lack the knowl-
edge and skills of union representatives.1 7 Fourth, co-workers,
unlike union representatives, might compromise confidentiality,
thereby embarrassing the interviewee and compromising the
employer's investigation by restricting the employer's ability to
discover the truth and discouraging other employees from com-
ing forward with relevant information. 172 With respect to confi-
166. Id., slip op. at 2-3 (quoting Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 125). The Board
dismissed any objection to yet another change of direction, stating: "we engage
in a process both anticipated and approved by the Supreme Court in Wein-
garten," id., slip op. at 3, and necessary "to adapt the Act to changing patterns of
industrial life." Id., slip op. at 4 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266).
167. Id., slip op. at 4. As the dissent points out, the majority did not offer
any factual support, let alone empirical evidence, for these assertions. Id., slip
op. at 18 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
168. Id., slip op. at 4.
169. Id., slip op. at 4-5. The majority also expressed concern over the
possibility that an employee might choose a co-conspirator in misconduct as a
representative. The Board, however, has previously held that an employee does
not have an unlimited right to insist on the presence of a particular co-worker
as his representative. Id. See also Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 236, 339
N.L.R.B. No. 156, slip op. 1199, 1200 (Aug. 21, 2003).
170. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 5
171. Id.
172. Id., slip op. at 6. The majority further opined that a co-worker's
presence may also "inhibit the targeted employee from candidly answering the
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dentiality-and without focusing on the reality that a union's
fiduciary obligations run to member employees rather than
employers-the majority stressed that the duty of union repre-
sentatives to provide fair representation precludes them from
engaging in bad faith revelations of information disclosed in the
course of investigative interviews. After reviewing these points,
the majority concluded: "[0] n balance, the right of an employee
to a co-worker's presence in the absence of a union is out-
weighed by an employer's right to conduct prompt, efficient,
thorough, and confidential workplace investigations. '"174
The majority explained that its decision freed the parties
from the consequences of foregoing investigative interviews.
Employers would no longer need to make decisions on "incom-
plete . . . [or] erroneous information," face "charges that [they]
did not conduct a fair and thorough investigation," 175 or disci-
pline an employee without listening to the employee's side of the
story. 176 The majority also solicitously explained that the deci-
sion would save employees from themselves by eliminating the
risk that an employee might decide to forego "the chance to tell
his [or her own] version of the incident ... 177 Clearly cogni-
zant of the vulnerability of non-union employees, the majority
attempted to counter concern about coerced statements by not-
ing the availability of other minimal "due process" safeguards
such as peer mediation and ombudsmen, as well as the existence
of whistleblower statutes. 17  The majority also placed great
emphasis on its ruling that, while employers can order workers to
participate in investigative interviews without a co-worker or any
other witness, they cannot discipline employees simply for asking
permission for a co-worker to attend the interview.1 7 9
In closing, the IBM Corporation majority denied the dissent-
ers' accusation that it was leading the charge in opening "a new
questions posed by the employer," id., and infringe on the employer's "interest
in keeping quiet the fact of the inquiry and the substance of the questions
asked." Id.
173. Id., slip op. at 6 n.10 (citing Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525
U.S. 33, 44 (1998)). The majority's emphasis on this point is attenuated. The
fiduciary duty of fair representation runs to the union's members, not to
employers. See Marquez, 525 U.S. 33.
174. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see also discussion of Member Hunter's dissent in Materials
Research Corporation, supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
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front in the war on terrorism."' 80 Nevertheless, the substantive
portion of the opinion stressed the theme infusing the entire
analysis: "security concerns that are an out-growth of the troub-
led times in which we live"18 justify permitting employers to
question employees "on a private basis."'' 8 2
2. The Schaumber Concurrence
Member Schaumber noted his agreement with the policy
analysis offered by the Chairman and Member Meisburg,
explaining that he wrote separately to emphasize his views on the
appropriate statutory interpretation. 8 ' Returning to the theme
originally proposed by Chairman Van de Water in Materials
Research Corporation,"8 4 despite its rejection by the Third Circuit
in Du Pont ,"185 Schaumber interpreted Section 9(a) of the
NLRA to preclude extension of Weingarten rights to employees in
non-unionized workforces.1
s6
C. The IBM Corporation Dissenters' Perspective
NLRB Members Liebman and Walsh dissented from the
Board's ruling, anchoring their opposition to the majority's deci-
sion on Section 7's recognition of the right of workers
"'to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of...
mutual aid or protection."'1 8 7 The dissenters found it "hard to
imagine an act more basic to 'mutual aid or protection' than
turning to a co-worker for help when faced with an interview that
might end with the employee fired."' 8 They took the majority to
180. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id., slip op. at 8 (Schaumber, Member, concurring).
184. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982), overruled in part
by Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985); see also supra Part I.C. The
text of Section 9(a) is set forth supra note 104.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
186. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 8 (Schaumber, Member,
concurring).
187. Id. at 18 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting) (quoting 29
U.S.C.A. § 157 (2004)). For the text of Section 7, see supra note 20.
188. Id.; cf. Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1100 (D.C. Cir.
2001) ("The Board's determination that an employee's request for a co-
worker's presence at an investigatory interview is concerted action for mutual
aid and protection and thus within the realm of § 7 is ... reasonable."); Materi-
als Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1014 ("Indeed, when confronted with the
prospect of an investigatory interview which might result in discipline, the only
assistance readily available to an unrepresented employee lies in fellow employ-
ees, and an employee attempt to enlist that type of protection is precisely what
the Act is designed to safeguard.").
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task for concluding "[w]ith little interest in empirical evi-
dence '" '89 that "non-union workers are not capable of represent-
ing each other effectively and therefore have no right to
representation."'9 0 Members Liebman and Walsh emphatically
rejected the conclusion that affording Weingarten rights to non-
union employees poses any danger to American workplaces19 '
and admonished that "[d] ue process in the non-union workplace
should not be sacrificed on such dubious grounds."' 92
Observing that "[w]orkers without unions can and do suc-
cessfully stand up for each other on the job-and they have the
legal right to try, whether or not they succeed,"' 93 the dissenters
delivered a stinging rebuke to the majority:
We are told that everything has changed in "today's troub-
led world," following "terrorist attacks on our country," the
rise of workplace violence, and an increase in "corporate
abuse and fiduciary lapses." But allowing workers to
represent each other has no conceivable connection with
workplace violence and precious little with corporate
wrongdoing, which in any case seems concentrated in the
executive suite, not the employee cubicle or the factory
floor. Finally, we would hope that the American workplace
has not yet become a new front in the war on terrorism
and that the Board would not be leading the charge,
unbidden by other authorities.1 94
Pointing out that the rights at stake affect "the great majority
of American workers," Members Liebman and Walsh observed
that prior to the IBM Corporation decision the NLRB had
extended Weingarten rights to all employees. 195 They excoriated
the majority for "eliminat[ing] the Weingarten right for non-
189. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 18 (Liebman & Walsh, Mem-
bers, dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id., slip op. at 19. The dissent noted, however, that the availability of
Weingarten rights was not widely known: "As one commentator has observed,
before Epilepsy Foundation, the 'scope of coverage of section 7 and its applica-
tion to non-union employees may have been one of the best-kept secrets of
labor law."' Id. (quoting William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the
Twenty-first Century: Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
259, 267 (2002) (footnote omitted)). The subject, however, is of ongoing con-
cern in many quarters. For example, references to Weingarten rights appear in
numerous articles dealing with the conduct of corporate internal investigations.
See, e.g., Coyne & Barker, supra note 7, at 172.
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union workers, leaving intact only the protection against dis-
charge or discipline based on the mere request for a co-worker
representative, and emphasized that permitting the presence
of a co-worker in an investigative interview "greatly enhances the
employees' opportunities to act in concert to address their con-
cern 'that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice
of imposing punishment unjustly. "197
Members Liebman and Walsh began their dissent by con-
testing Member Schaumber's implication that the interpretation
of the NLRA underlying the Board's decision in Epilepsy Founda-
tion was impermissible. Noting that the NLRA "put an end to
narrow notions of when employees were free to act together,"'9 8
they disputed Schaumber's interpretation of concertedness and
contended that his views clashed with Weingarten, as well as with
the explicit holdings of both the D.C. Circuit and the Third Cir-
cuit in Epilepsy Foundation and DuPont I, respectively.' 99
The dissenters then addressed the reasoning of the Battista-
Meisburg majority opinion on a point-by-point basis, beginning
by faulting the majority for failing to provide compelling argu-
ments explaining "either why there is no Section 7 right impli-
cated here or why, on balance, that right is outweighed-in every
case, regardless of the circumstances-by other considerations
that the Board legitimately can give weight."200 They focused in
particular on the majority's identification of differences between
unionized and non-unionized employees for purposes of Wein-
garten rights, accusing the Chairman and Member Meisburg of
"confus[ing] the efficacy of a right with its existence." '' In the
dissenters' view, the majority offered "a powerful case for unioni-
196. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 20 (Liebman & Walsh, Mem-
bers, dissenting).
197. Id., slip op. at 19 (quoting Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331
N.L.R.B. 676, 678 (2000)). In Materials Research Corporation, the Board recog-
nized requests for assistance from co-workers, seeking mutual aid or protection,
as "concerted activity-in its most basic form," id. at 19-20 (quoting Materials
Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1015 (1982)), because the existence of
these rights assures all employees "that they too can avail themselves of the
assistance of a co-worker in like circumstances . Id., slip op. at 20 (citing
Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015).
198. Id., slip op. at 21 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id., slip op. at 22. The opinion contended that Section 7 does not
differentiate among union and non-union representatives on the basis of their
ability to represent the entire workforce, their capacity to redress the imbalance
of power between employers and employees, or their relative skill sets.
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zation, but a weak one for refusing to recognize the rights of
non-union workers."20 2
Members Liebman and Walsh also objected to the majority's
emphasis on the "critical difference between a unionized work
force and a non-union work force, '2 3 particularly the notion
that an employer whose workforce is not unionized is free "to
deal with its employees on an individual basis. '2 4 In their view:
Simply put, requiring a non-union employer to permit co-
worker representation (if it chooses to conduct an investi-
gatory interview) is not the equivalent of requiring the
employer to bargain with, or to deal with, the representa-
tive. Describing that argument as based on the "historic
distinction between unionized and non-union employers,"
as opposed to the Act itself, does not save it.20 5
Like the majority's approach, however, the thrust of the dis-
senters' attack addressed policy arguments-specifically, the
majority's assertions that employers must be free to conduct
internal investigations without permitting an employee to have a
co-worker present because of expanding legal obligations and
increasing security concerns. 20 6  The dissenters rejected the
majority's position on two principal grounds: their apparent will-
ingness "to pretend that non-union employees have no Section 7
rights that must be respected,20 7 and the absence of any eviden-
tiary "basis to conclude that co-worker representation has had, or
[was] likely [to] have, any of the harmful consequences" pre-
dicted by the majority.2 8
With respect to the former point, the dissenters suggested
that, rather than complete abrogation of Section 7 rights, a "pro-
cess . . . of balancing and accommodation, conducted case-by-
case, as federal labor law has long recognized in other contexts,"
would be more appropriate. 20 9 Accepting arguendo the majority's
conclusion that the presence of a co-worker could make employ-
202. Id., slip op. at 21.
203. Id., slip op. at 22.
204. Id.
205. Id. (footnote omitted). The majority's contention on this point is
virtually identical to that of the Sears, Roebuck and Company majority-an
approach Matthew Finkin describes as "rest[ing] upon a non sequitur." Finkin,
supra note 9, at 182. See also supra note 103.
206. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 22-23 (Liebman & Walsh,
Members, dissenting).
207. Id., slip op. at 22.
208. Id. The dissenters pointed out that no case had yet come before the
Board reflecting that Weingarten rights for either unionized or non-unionized
employees had created any actual harm. Id.
209. Id.
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ers' investigative tasks somewhat more difficult, the dissenters
echoed the Supreme Court's earlier admonition that adherence
to "legal requirements or moral norms"21 often imposes some
costs. Sardonically commenting that "Star Chamber proceed-
ings, in contrast, were wonderfully efficient,"2"' the dissenters
argued that co-worker representation should be deemed a pre-
sumptive right that could be overcome in appropriate
circumstances.212
The dissenters also rejected the majority's conclusion that
permitting an employee to have a co-worker present during the
course of an investigative interview cripples the employer's ability
to conduct the interview effectively, especially disagreeing with
the majority's conclusion that a union representative is more
likely to safeguard important employer interests in confidential-
ity. To the contrary, the dissenters stressed that "[n] othing in a
union's statutory duty of fair representation, which runs to
employees, requires the union to serve the employer's interests,
whether in imposing discipline or preserving confidentiality. 213
In their view, "given the skill of union representatives and the
power of union solidarity (factors noted by the majority), permit-
ting union representation is, if anything, more likely to complicate
an employer's investigation than permitting co-worker represen-
tation in non-union workplaces."214 They attacked the majority's
view on this point as a rote repetition of "the unsupported asser-
tions of employer advocates," 215 reflecting "a startling lack of
interest in what is actually happening in American
workplaces. "216
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. As Gorman and Finkin point out, "The Labor Board has devel-
oped a highly nuanced body of law under Weingarten." GoRMAN & FINKIN,
supra note 7, at 528. For discussion of these rights, see id. at 528-30. See also,
e.g., Castagnera, Termination of Update, supra note 9; Cullen, supra note 9; Hop-
son, supra note 9. See generally, Heldman et al., supra note 9.
213. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 22 (Liebman & Walsh, Mem-
bers, dissenting). A union's duty of fair representation clearly runs to its mem-
bers. See supra note 169. Moreover, the Board has upheld reasonable
confidentiality policies pertaining to ongoing investigations. See infta note 250.
214. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 22-23 (Liebman & Walsh,
Members, dissenting). Turning to the record in the case before the Board, as
well as the history of Weingarten rights for both union and non-union workers,
the dissenters contended that "[n]othing in the record shows that investiga-
tions have come to a halt because of the presence of a co-worker at an investiga-
tory interview, or that information obtained during such an interview has been
compromised." Id., slip op. at 23.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Finally, while Members Liebman and Walsh emphasized that
they did not interpret the NLRA to mandate the same kinds of
constitutional safeguards applicable to persons suspected of
criminal activity,2 17 they concluded that "modest as the Wein-
garten right is, it brings a measure of due process to workplace
discipline, particularly in non-union workplaces, where employ-
ees and their representatives typically are at-will employees, who
may be discharged or disciplined for any reason not specifically
prohibited by law." ' Thus, "[fWar from being an anachronism,
then, Epilepsy Foundation is in perfect step with the times," '219 and
affording Weingarten rights to all workers "contributes to a work-
place in which employers respect something like the rule of
law."
2 2 0
III. THE IBM CoPORATION BoARD's FLAWED POLICY ANALYSIS
The tenor of the NLRB's decisions with respect to Weingarten
rights is directly traceable to the prevailing political climate.2 2 '
Ironically, one of the most fascinating aspects of the ongoing
debate is the tendency of liberals to focus on how their decisions
will aid management, while conservatives praise the skills of
union representatives. Presumably, both sides engage in this
exercise in an effort to preempt the objections of their counter-
parts. At times, however, the debate approaches absurdity. The
Weingarten Court itself joined in the game. Justice Brennan, the
liberal Democrat who authored the opinion, chose to emphasize
the ways in which the presence of union representatives could
facilitate the fact-finding process and otherwise assist managers
conducting investigative interviews.2 22 Conservative NLRB mem-
bers, picking up on this approach, invariably laud the skills of
shop stewards, express solicitude for the exclusive bargaining
217. Id. For discussion of the significant differences between Weingarten
rights and those guaranteed to persons accused of crimes pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), see Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 205 (noting,
for example, that Weingarten imposes no obligation on employers to notify
employees of their rights to representation).
218. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 23 (Liebman & Walsh, Mcm-
bers, dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Id. The dissenters accuse the majority of overruling important pre-
cedent "not because they must . ..but because they can." Id. Cf Epilepsy
Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (2001) ("It is a fact of life in
NLRB lore that certain substantive provisions of the NLRA invariably fluctuate
with the changing compositions of the Board.").
221. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
222. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 263 (1975); text
accompanying supra notes 49-50.
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rights of unions, and caution that affording Weingarten rights to
non-union workers may hurt more than help these employees.223
While liberals talk of assisting management, 224 conservatives
imbue union representatives with great virtue, including a deep
sense of fiduciary obligation, a remarkable ability to facilitate
employer-employee dialogue, and admirable discretion. 225 One
might readily conclude that managers welcome the presence of
union representatives in investigative interviews. 226 Unfortu-
nately, the picture painted has little to do with reality.
The most pernicious aspect of IBM Corporation, however, is
not the majority's rehashing of old issues, but the claim that it is
necessary to deprive non-union employees of Weingarten rights to
protect national security, safeguard corporate integrity, and
make workplaces safer. This assertion is not only insupportable,
it is a dangerous proclamation that must not go unchallenged.
A. The Fallacies Inherent in the Majority's General Expressions
of Concern
1. The Misguided Notion that Elimination of Weingarten
Rights Will Facilitate Discovery of the Truth
The IBM Corporation majority focuses a great deal on the spe-
cial skills and obligations it attributes to union representatives, as
well as their purported ability to make a difference in the out-
comes of investigative interviews. 227 As the dissenters point out,
however, a union representative's duty runs to the interviewee
and the members of the bargaining unit, not to the employer.228
It is not the union representative's job to help management.
Consequently, a union representative should attempt to facilitate
223. See, e.g., IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 4-6; E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 628 (1988).
224. See, e.g., Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 263 ("A knowledgeable union repre-
sentative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts.").
225. See, e.g., IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 4-6 (noting special
skills and fiduciary obligations of union representatives as well as their adher-
ence to confidentiality requirements).
226. See id., slip op. at 22-23 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting)
("given the skill of union representatives and the power of union solidarity (fac-
tors noted by the majority), permitting union representation is, if anything,
more likely to complicate an employer's investigation than permitting co-worker
representation").
227. Id. In response, the dissenters observed: "[T]here is no evidence
before the Board either that unions have interfered with employers' investiga-
tory obligations since 1975, when Weingarten was decided, or that co-worker rep-
resentatives have caused harm since Epilepsy Foundation was issued in 2000." Id.,
slip op. at 23.
228. See id.; see also Finkin, supra note 9, at 183-85.
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the fact-finding process only when it is in the interviewee's best
interest to do so. Even then, the information that the employee
and his or her union representative wish to convey may not be
what the supervisor or manager is seeking to discover.
As the NLRB recognized in both Materials Research Corpora-
tion and Epilepsy Foundation, the most critical function of a repre-
sentative may be simply to provide moral support and to serve as
a witness to the events taking place.229 There is no reason why a
co-worker would be unable to perform these functions equally
well. "Moreover, a co-worker who has witnessed employer action
and can accurately inform co-employees may diminish any ten-
dency by an employer to act unjustly or arbitrarily."23 °
Neither is there any basis for presuming that the presence of
a non-union co-worker, rather than a union representative,
would compromise the ability of managers to ferret out the truth
in an interview. As the IBM Corporation majority itself points out,
a union representative symbolizes the collective power of an
entire bargaining unit and a set of negotiated rights guaranteed
by a contract binding on the employer as well as the employee.2 '
If anything, as the dissenters suggest, the presence of a union
representative seems more likely to empower an employee than
to encourage acquiescence in management demands.23 2 It
defies common sense to believe that union members seek the
presence of their representatives at disciplinary hearings to facili-
tate the fact-finding process rather than to protect themselves.
In Weingarten, as well as in other contexts, the Supreme
Court has rejected similar arguments about the dire conse-
quences of admitting third parties-even union representa-
tives-to investigative interviews. The Court, for example,
dismissed the argument of NASA's Inspector General that investi-
gative interviews conducted by her investigators should not be
deemed subject to a provision of the Federal Service Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act 233 affording Weingarten rights to union-
ized federal workers. The Inspector General insisted that the
attendance of union representatives at investigative interviews
would compromise the ability of investigators to unearth the
229. See Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000); Materials
Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1015 (1982) ("the type of assistance that
any individual can provide in the situation outlined in Weingarten is limited and
can certainly be performed by a fellow employee").
230. Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
231. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 4.
232. Id., slip. op. at 23 (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
233. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a) (2) (B) (2000).
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truth and maintain confidentiality.2 " 4  The Supreme Court
emphatically rebuffed this contention, specifically observing that
"[wihenever a procedural protection plays a meaningful role in an inves-
tigation, it may impose some burden on the investigators.
23 5
The notion that an employee accompanied by a co-worker is
less likely to tell the truth is also suspect. As a recent article
points out:
That claim is wrong as a matter of practical reality. This
culture has come to understand that isolating vulnerable
witnesses from all sources of support, in intimidating situa-
tions where they have much to lose, is not (as a factual mat-
ter) the method best designed to discover the truth....
An employee who is scared, isolated, and feeling no sense
of control whatsoever over an investigatory meeting often
has less ability to present her own accurate explanation of
the facts at issue .. .than she would have if she were sup-
ported by a co-worker. There is no real reason to believe
that more truth will emerge in a one-sided meeting than in
a meeting with a more level balance of power.
236
This reasoning is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's
admonition in Weingarten that an employee summoned to an
investigative interview alone "may be too fearful or inarticu-
late . ..or too ignorant" to explain the facts pertaining to an
incident under investigation. 23 7 The presence of a co-worker
could help solve this problem.
2. The Dubious Legitimacy of Forcing Workers to Participate
in Investigative Interviews
It is remarkable that anyone seriously could suggest that tak-
ing away an employee's option to have a co-worker present dur-
ing an investigative interview that may result in disciplinary
sanctions is in his or her best interest. The IBM Corporation
majority, however, argues that withdrawing Weingarten rights
ensures that non-unionized employees will have an opportunity
to explain their perspectives on incidents that could result in dis-
ciplinary sanctions, a privilege they might mistakenly decline if
offered an opportunity to make their own decisions. 2 a This con-
tention is either misguided or disingenuous. One could make
the same kinds of arguments about the Fifth Amendment-why
234. NASA v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 527 U.S. 229, 233 (1999).
235. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
236. Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 213.
237. NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 263 (1975).
238. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 7 (June 9, 2004).
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not delete the privilege against self-incrimination from the Bill of
Rights to prevent accused persons from foolishly foregoing the
opportunity to tell their own stories? This paternalistic approach
both abrogates individual responsibility and flies in the face of
our society's sense of fair play.2" 9
Nor does elimination of Weingarten rights for non-union
employees accord with the Board majority's stated objective of
permitting managers to conduct investigations "in a thorough,
sensitive, and discrete manner."240 Unfortunately, excluding wit-
nesses does not guarantee either discretion or sensitivity. As the
IBM Corporation dissenters note, "Star Chamber proceedings...
were wonderfully efficient."24' Those who convened the infa-
mous court were undoubtedly quite discrete, but few would call
their conduct either sensitive or fair. While workplace interviews
are a long way from the crown's notorious court, the dissenters'
point is well taken. The philosophy of openness infuses our
entire system for a reason. The NLRB, for example, is one of the
many federal agencies subject to the Sunshine Act,2 4 2 and the
vast majority of employers covered by the NLRA are corporations
subject to the public filing requirements of state corporations
codes, 243 as well as the financial disclosure mandates of federal
securities laws. 24 4 Requiring employers to honor a request for
the presence of a co-worker in a proceeding that may well result
in discipline or termination hardly seems a more onerous bur-
den given the gravity of the stakes for individual employees. 245
Nor is it reasonable to suggest that elimination of Weingarten
rights is necessary because employers will choose to forego inter-
views rather than allow a co-worker to be present. As one recent
article notes:
239. Nor does it accord with numerous rulings by labor arbitrators in pro-
ceedings involving employees' invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Although in the absence of state action, private-sector employees have no
basis to claim constitutional protections in connection with employment issues,
arbitrators sometimes impose basic procedural protections. See supra note 17.
240. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 3.
241. Id., slip op. at 22.
242. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2000). See gener-
ally STANLEY R. STRAUSS & JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 164-67 (5th ed. 1996).
243. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 204 & 204.5 (West 2005); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 103 (2005).
244. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28 & 29 U.S.C.).
245. See NASA v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 527 U.S. 229, 233 (1999).
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[This concern] postulates the most unreasonable sort of
employer (i.e., the employer who elevates its own interest
in dominance and control) over the desire to obtain fac-
tual information, to such a degree that it is willing to
forego any chance of obtaining useful information in
order to avoid encountering concerted activity among its
employees and oddly urges that the law should cater to the
behavior of that employer.
246
3. The Erroneous Idea that Privacy Concerns Preclude Co-
worker But Not Union Representation
To the extent that the IBM Corporation majority's privacy
concerns pertain to persons other than employees summoned to
investigative interviews, it is fair to say that employers need to be
sensitive to the privacy of alleged harassment victims or other
complainants. It is the employer who decides how much infor-
mation to reveal in the course of an investigation. In any event,
the principal concern expressed by the IBM Corporation majority
appears to focus on the potential of embarrassment of the inter-
viewees themselves.
As noted above, the majority speculates that a co-worker is
far more likely than a union representative to let information slip
from the interview, especially inadvertently, although no reason
is offered in support of this conclusion.2 4 7 While union repre-
sentatives do have fiduciary obligations to the employees they
represent,2 4 fiduciary relationships are neither necessary to the
maintenance of confidences nor a guarantee of discretion.
Union representatives, like managers, are susceptible to human
frailties. Moreover, their obligations to the bargaining units they
represent, as well as union governance structures, may impose
obligations to pass on what happens in an investigative interview
to other persons who would not otherwise be involved in the mat-
ter. As the Supreme Court itself pointed out in rejecting argu-
246. Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 215.
247. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 6 (June 9, 2004). See
Castagnera, Termination of Update, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that the majority
was "giving a nod to employers' particular problem with fulfilling their duties
under Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes"). See, e.g., Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000); Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
248. Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (citing Vaca v.
Spies, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)) ("A union breaches the duty of fair representa-
tion when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith."). See generally GoRMAN & FINKIN, supra note 7, at
527.
WEINGARTEN RIGHTS FOR NON-UNION EMPLOYEES
ments against the presence of union representatives in interviews
conducted by federal inspectors general, it is "no doubt correct
[to] suggest [ ] that the presence of a union representative at an
examination will increase the likelihood that its contents will be
disclosed to third parties. "249 The Board's attempt to draw a
bright-line distinction between union representatives and co-
workers with respect to confidentiality is unwarranted.
In any event, it is the interviewee who must live with the con-
sequences of a decision to have a third party present during an
investigative interview-whether that third person is a union rep-
resentative or a non-union co-worker. An employee about to be
interviewed is in a far better position than the Board to assess the
relative benefits and drawbacks of having a co-worker present in
a particular situation, and the employee is free to ask the co-
worker to leave once the interview is underway. An employee
who wishes to keep a particular incident quiet presumably either
would elect not to exercise Weingarten rights or select a co-worker
representative with care. Unfortunately, IBM Corporation affords
an employee no alternative but to face his or her interrogators
alone.
Moreover, the confidentiality interests of both employers
and employees can be safeguarded with reasonable restrictions
on disclosure of information revealed in the course of investiga-
tive interviews. The Board has previously upheld reasonable con-
fidentiality policies, as well as disciplinary sanctions for their
violation.25 °
249. NASA, 527 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 208-10.
250. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 271, 272 (2001) (uphold-
ing employer's confidentiality rule and discharge of employee who violated it
on grounds that employer's interest in confidentiality of ongoing drug investi-
gation outweighed worker's right "to discuss discipline or disciplinary investiga-
tions involving fellow employees"); cf. Phoenix Transit System, 337 N.L.R.B. 510
(2002) (holding employer violated NLRA Section 8(a) (1) "by maintaining a
confidentiality rule prohibiting employees from discussing their sexual harass-
ment complaints among themselves" after the investigation ended because
employer failed to show any legitimate justification for continuing to impose
the rule after its investigation had ceased).
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B. The Illegitimacy of Relying on the Frequency of Workplace
Investigations, Corporate Scandal, Terrorism, or Workplace
Violence to Justify Eliminating Weingarten
Rights for Employees Who Do Not
Belong to Unions
The IBM Corporation majority's conclusion, that arguments
against providing Weingarten rights to non-unionized employees
have a "new vitality" '251 because of the troubled times in which we
live, is both myopic and one-sided. The following discussion
focuses on the specific points raised by the majority in support of
its pronouncement. None withstands scrutiny.
1. The Increasing Frequency of Workplace Investigations as a
Basis for Taking Away Employee Rights
The IBM Corporation majority is correct that the number of
workplace investigations has increased in recent years. To some
extent this change is due to legislation mandating investigation
of various types of events, but it is principally the result of corpo-
rate decisions to attempt to avoid the escalating costs of civil and
criminal liability exposure. These decisions are, in turn, fueled
by the expansion of anti-discrimination laws, the erosion of the
at-will employment doctrine in many states, and the rush to cre-
ate organizational compliance programs in the wake of
expanded criminal prosecution of corporations and corporate
executives. 252 In each of these cases, the increase in the number
of workplace investigations arises in large part from society's
desire to hold corporations accountable for conduct attributable
to these entities and their managers, including financial dishon-
esty, environmental damage, treatment of workers, and harass-
ment or other discriminatory practices.
251. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 4.
252. See generally Duggin, supra note *, at 884-87; Thomas Holliday &
CharlesJ. Stevens, Disclosure of Results of Internal Investigations to the Government or
Other Third Parties, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 7, at
283-85. Statutory provisions that specifically require investigations include:
National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2000)); Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§651-678 (2000); Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of
1986, 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-58 (2000) (requiring government contractors to report
reasonable grounds to believe kickback has occurred to Inspector General of
contracting federal agencies). Other statutes encourage internal investigating
by imposing criminal and civil penalties for concealment of knowledge of viola-
tions such as unwarranted receipt of federal funds. See, e.g., Medicare Fraud
Reporting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3) (2000).
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The majority's reliance on increases in the number of work-
place investigations as a justification for depriving non-union
workers of Weingarten rights is specious. Surely an increase in the
number of arrests of corporate officers and directors would not
justify eliminating Miranda warnings or restricting the right of
accused executives-or any other individual or group-to coun-
sel. The mere fact that more workers might seek to invoke Wein-
garten rights does not justify elimination of these safeguards any
more than an increase in invocation of the guarantees of the first
ten amendments to the Constitution would justify abrogation of
the Bill of Rights.
2. The Specter of Terrorism and Workplace Violence as a
Rationale for Requiring Employees to Face
Interrogation Alone
Terrorism and violence are indeed tragic realities of our
times, and there is no doubt that vigilance is necessary to prevent
the kinds of horrendous incidents that have cost so many inno-
cent lives. It does not, however, benefit anyone to permit the
mere invocation of these words to justify the withdrawal of rights
that have little, if any, conceivable connection to either national
security or workplace safety. Contrary to the IBM Corporation
majority's assertions, 25 3 neither the tragic events of September
11, 2001 nor concerns over workplace violence provide any
rational basis for withdrawing Weingarten rights from non-union
employees. Even a cursory review of history demonstrates that in
equally troubled times in the past, earlier Boards saw no such
connection.
In 1972, when the NLRB first recognized the principle now
referred to as the Weingarten right, the United States was in the
midst of one the most turbulent eras in its national history.
Throughout the country, violent crime was approaching its all-
time high,254 and there was a great deal of racial tension.255 The
253. IBM, 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 4.
254. Per capita violent crime rates peaked in 1973. Emerging Trends in
Employment and Labor Law: Examining the Need for Greater Workplace Security and the
Control of Workplace Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Rela-
tions of H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong. 17-28 (Sept. 26,
2002) (statement of Eugene Rugala, Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau
of Investigation). Since then, overall crime rates have declined steadily. Id. See
infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Thomas A. Johnson, Pentagon and Racism: Directive Stems from
Tensions that Have Plagued Services for 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1971, at 14;
Seth S. King, Black Leaders in Chicago Threaten Demonstrations if Police Superinten-
dent and Aides Aren't Removed, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1972, at 24; James M. Mark-
ham, Curfew Is Continued in Riot-Torn Camden, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1971, at 22;
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Vietnam War cast a shadow over the nation. Young soldiers
faced death in a far-away land, college students seized control of
buildings, and antiwar protests throughout the country often
ended in violence. 256 The Weather Underground, the Symbion-
ese Liberation Army, and other radical groups worked to
257destabilize the status quo. Only a year earlier, the
Weathermen had detonated a bomb in the U.S. Capitol, 25 8 and,
as 1971 drew to a close, a group of antiwar veterans seized and
occupied the Statue of Liberty. 259 On June 17, 1972, the Water-
gate scandal burst into the limelight when police apprehended
burglars fiddling with eavesdropping equipment in the Demo-
cratic National Committee's Washington, D.C. headquarters.26 °
In the international arena, the Cold War dominated superpower
politics, 26 1 while the tensions that would erupt into the Yom Kip-
pur War during the following year continued to rise.2 62 Violence
Jon Nordheimer, Racial Tension Rises in Baton Rouge as Versions of Shootout that
Killed Four Vary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1972, at 27.
256. See, e.g., PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1997);
Martin Arnold, Campus Protests on War Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1972, at 1;
Martin Arnold, Harvard Center Is Stormed as Antiwar Protests Erupt Anew on US.
Campuses: Students Pillage Offices; Smash Windows, Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,
1972, at 1 ;John Darnton, Violent Actions Reported Rising, Frustration Also Mounts as
Students Express Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1972, at 1.
257. See, e.g., Lucinda Franks, The 4-Year Odyssey ofJane Alpert, from Revolu-
tionary Bomber to Feminist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1975, at 14; Tad Szulc, U.S. Sets Up
Intelligence Group to Combat Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1972, at 4. Less than
two years later, the Symbionese Liberation Army would achieve infamy in con-
nection with the kidnapping and alleged brainwashing of heiress Patty Hearst;
see Wallace Turner, Granddaughter of Hearst Abducted by 3, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1974, at 77, as well as other violent crimes. See, e.g., Earl Caldwell, Bullets that
Killed Oakland Educator Contained Cyanide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1973, at 63. Amer-
ican extremists and Palestinian terrorists were also reportedly working together
on a "spectacular act" in the United States. Palestinians Said to Plot "Spectacular
Act" in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1972, at 4.
258. RON JACOBS, THE WAY THE WIND BLEW: A HISTORY OF THE WEATHER
UNDERGROUND 198 (1997).
259. Robert D. McFadden, War Foes Seize Statue of Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 1971, at 1.
260. For a comprehensive journalistic treatment of the Watergate scan-
dal, see Revisiting Watergate, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost. com/wpsrv/national/longterm/Watergate/fronthtm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2005). President Nixon resigned from office on August 8, 1974, as a
result of the scandal. Forty other individuals were indicted, and several served
prison terms. Id.
261. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 256, at 911 ("During the 1970s the
Cold War spread to virtually every part of the globe").
262. See, e.g., Terrence Smith, Israel's Hopes for Stability in Gaza Wane, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1972, at 8; Terrence Smith, Israel After the Slayings: Munich Events
Seem to End Prospect of Serious Talks With the Arabs Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1972,
at 16.
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reigned in Northern Ireland in a year that began with "Bloody
Sunday";263 terrorists stormed the Munich Olympic Village, mur-
dering eleven Israeli athletes;264 and Black September, Baader
Mienhoff, and a host of other groups and individuals hijacked
airplanes, detonated bombs, and engaged in terrorist activities
that bred fear and distrust in venues around the world.2 6 5
In 1975, the year of the Supreme Court's Weingarten deci-
sion, would-be assassins attempted to shoot President Gerald
Ford in two different cities within one three-week period. 266 Rad-
ical groups continued to attack domestic targets as a bomb
exploded in the Washington, D.C. headquarters of the State
Department, 267 and members of the Weathermen blew up a fac-
tory in Connecticut and abducted three employees268 in the
course of "a mini-war against the United States government. '"269
263. See, e.g., Bloody Sunday in Deny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1972, at 36; British
Soldiers Kill 13 as Rioting Erupts in Ulster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1972, at 1.
264. See, e.g., Martin Arnold, Leaders Around the World Express Horror at the
Guerilla Attack at Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1972, at 19; Arthur Daley, A Day of
Mourning and Sorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1972, at 55.
265. See, e.g., 15 Injured in Hamburg Blasts at Springer's Publishing Plant, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1972, at 3 (reporting fifth bomb explosion in West Germany in
an eight-day period); 4 Armed Arab Hijackers Hold Jet and 101 Hostages in Israel,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1972, at 1; David Binder, Messages With Lethal Bombs, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1972, at E3; Bomb Threat Empties Streets of Stuttgart at Midday, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 1972, at 8; John M. Goshko, Bomb Injures Wife of German Judge,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 11, 1972, at A16; Eric Pace, Again the Men in Masks: Again the
Death of Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1973, at 195; Eric Pace, The Black September
Guerillas: Elusive Trail in Seven Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1972, at 97; Eric
Pace, Black September Guerrillas' Strength Is Estimated at 300, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
1972, at 12. Airplane hijackings became so common that airline pilots around
the world threatened to strike and to boycott airports in particular countries
unless the United Nations and member governments took action. Pilots
Threaten to Strike to Press Anti-Hijack Steps, WASH. POST, June 9, 1972, at A3. See,
e.g., Robert Alden, Bush Expresses Outrage at Hijacking, and Calls U.N. Too Slow on
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1972, at 11; Robert Alden, U.N. Will Debate Terror-
ism Issue; Challenge Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1972, at 1; Death Penalty Voted by
House, 354-2, for Air Hijackers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1972, at 13; Tad Szulc, U.S.
Moves for World Campaign To Counter Political Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1972,
at 1.
266. See, e.g., David Bird, Violence and Presidents, From Jackson to Reagan,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1981, at A6; Lacey Fosburgh, Cheers, Then a Shot, and Crowd
Screams, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1975, at 77; Robert D. McFadden, Suspect Was
Defender of the Manson 'Family', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1975, at 49.
267. See David Binder, 6, 000 in D.C. lee in Bomb Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 1975, at 73; John T. McQuiston, State Department Bombed in Protest, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1975, at 1.
268. See 3 Men Blow Up Plant in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1975, at 1.
269. Kirkpatrick Sale, The Political Underground Is Small and Often Violent,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1975, at 201. See Lucinda Franks, U.S. Inquiry Finds 37 in
Weather Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1975, at 38. William J. Casey, then
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Membership in the Weathermen, the Black Liberation Army, the
FALN and other underground groups was estimated at twenty
thousand or more.2 70 Internationally, the government of South
Vietnam fell to the Communists, 27 1 and the Cold War persisted
as weapons arsenals grew, along with fears of space lasers and
"killer satellites. 2 72 Bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings con-
tinued,273 and airline hijackings and other terrorist activities
prompted renewed national and international efforts to stop
terrorism.2 7 4
By 1982, the year the Board initially ruled that Weingarten
rights extended to non-union employees, President Reagan had
been seriously wounded byJohn Hinckley-yet another would-be
assassin-and Pope John Paul II had been gravely injured by
another attacker.275 The Vietnam War had ended, but relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union remained tense
for many reasons, including the ongoing Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan and Soviet responses to increasing political activism
in Poland. 27 6 Terrorists were still active around the globe as the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency warned that "the US must be pre-
pared to counter 'far more lethal forms of violence,' including more sophisti-
cated and powerful bombs and possible attacks on nuclear power installations."
Daniel Southerland, CIA's Casey, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 29, 1982, at 12
(quoting William J. Casey).
270. Southerland, supra note 269.
271. See, e.g., George Esper, Communists Take Over Saigon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1975, at 1; Minh Surrenders, Vietcong in Saigon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1975, at 1.
272. See, e.g., Phil Stanford, The Automated Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1975, at SM1.
273. See, e.g., 3 Killed as Guerillas Seize and Blast West German Embassy in
Stockholm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1972, at 73; Dublin Airport Bombings Kill One and
Hurt Six, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1975, at 12; Clyde H. Farnsworth, Terrorists Raid
Vienna Oil Talk; 2 Killed, 60 Held, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1975, at 59; John L. Hess,
New Nations Join Search for the Man Known as "Carlos", N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1975,
at 4; Paul Kemezis, Dutch Government Is Thwarted in Its Efforts to Break Siege by East
Asian Terrorists Holding Hostages, Dec. 14, 1975, at 13; Killings in Latin Quarter
Expose Web of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1975, at 47; Robert B. Semple, Jr.,
Police Toughening Antiterrorist Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1975, at 1; Terror at La
Guardia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1975, at 59; The Killing that Never Ends in Ulster, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1975, at 155; Craig R. Whitney, Kidnappers Seize Berlin Candidate,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1975, at 1.
274. See, e.g., Venezuela Says It Will Propose Session on Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1975, at 10.
275. See, e.g., In a Crowd of the Faithful a Terrorist Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1981, at El; Paul Lewis, U.S. Asks Its Allies to Deny to Soviet Parts for Pipeline, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1982, at Al; Howell Raines, Reagan Wounded in Chest by Gunman;
Outlook 'Good' After 2-hour Surgegy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1981, at Al.
276. See, e.g., Edward Giradet, Soviets Accused of Civilian Bombings in
Afghanistan: French Doctors Say Attacks Used to Discourage Aid to Guerrillas, CHRIS-
TAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1982, at 3; Bernard Gwertzman, No Accord at Shultz-
WEINGARTEN RIGHTS FOR NON-UNION EMPLOYIEES
United States initiated an embargo against Libya in response to
Muammar Qaddafi's open support for violent extremists. 2 77 In
short, "troubled times" are nothing new.
a. Terrorism
The Board's myopic view of history is exacerbated by an
exaggerated sense of the relevance of workplace investigations to
the prevention of terrorism. The notion that denying Weingarten
rights to employees will help prevent terrorism is nonsense. The
Board cannot seriously expect employers to interrogate persons
they suspect of possible involvement in terrorist activities. To do
so would be ill-advised for a number of reasons, particularly the
safety of management employees and the likelihood of losing any
possibility of apprehending a suspect who realizes that an
employer has become suspicious of his or her behavior. Wein-
garten rights had no connection whatsoever to the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, and they have no conceivable link to any of the
terrorist events discussed by the FBI in its public reports on ter-
rorist activity in the United States over the past several years.
None of the terrorist threats or incidents reported by the FBI
involved employees engaging in terrorist endeavors of any kind
in the workplace.2 78 In any event, workplace discipline would
hardly be an appropriate response to suspected terrorist activity.
As the New York City Bar Association's Committee on Labor
and Employment stated in response to the IBM Corporation
decision:
[T]he need to fully protect society from potential terrorist
attack does not include a need for employers to interro-
gate employees about matters that could lead to discipline
without a representative present.... If the National Labor
Relations Act, as properly interpreted, provides a right to
have a representative present to assist the employee under
suspicion, that right is in no way diminished because of a
societal concern about terrorists' activity, however valid....
Gromyko Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1982, at A3; Bernard Gwertzman, Haig Said to
Drop Plans for Setting Atomic Arms Talks: Crisis in Poland Is Cited, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1982, at AI; Haig and Gromyko Hold "Sober" Talks on Range of Issues: Poland
Said to Cast Pall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1982, at 1.
277. See, e.g., Michael Getler & Lou Cannon, U.S. Bans Imports of Libyan
Oil: Qaddafi Accused of Plotting to Kill Americans in Sudan, WASH. POST, Mar. 11,
1982, at A2.
278. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, FBI PUB.
No. 0308, TERRORISM 2000/2001 (2004) (listing all terrorist incidents and
preventions within the United States and its territories in 2000 and 2001 that
were recorded by the FBI).
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[T] he threat of terrorism should not be used to modify the
interpretations of a statute passed in 1935 with a purpose
of regulating employer-employee relations. To rely on
such concerns . ..distorts the debate and unnecessarily
injects political considerations into a matter that should be
decided on its legal merits and has no relevance to the
question of whether or not an employee is or is not repre-
sented by a labor organization.
2 79
There are far more effective ways of intercepting potential
terrorists in particularly vulnerable facilities such as defense
plants, nuclear reactors, and other security-sensitive positions.
Background checks and security clearances offer one means of
accomplishing security objectives. 2 0 Federal regulations require
defense contractors to implement security plans that include
notification of the Department of Defense and other appropriate
authorities in the event of suspected security breaches, 281 and in
recent years, law enforcement agencies have taken extraordinary
steps to develop easily accessible channels for reporting suspi-
cious conduct in the workplace or anywhere else.28 2 Neither the
Pentagon nor the Department of Homeland Security has sug-
gested deputizing employers to seek out and interrogate sus-
pected terrorists.
b. The Reality of Workplace Violence
The IBM Corporation majority's references to workplace vio-
lence reflect fundamental misperceptions of the nature of the
problem. Contrary to the majority's assertions, workplace vio-
lence, along with most kinds of violent crime, has actually
279. New York City Bar Committee Position Paper, supra note 3, at 2.
280. Pre-employment checks may also assist in preventing workplace vio-
lence. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
281. See Federal Acquisition Regulation System, 48 C.F.R. ch. 2 app. B
(2005).
282. For example, the FBI's website provides a link for easy submission of
tips concerning suspicious activities. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Tips and
Public Leads, https://www.tips.fbi.gov (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). On the Wash-
ington, D.C. beltway and on U.S. Route 95 heading north and south out of the
city, as well as in other parts of the country, electronic overhead signs offer a
hotline number for reporting suspicious activities: 1-800492-TIPS. We need to
take care, however, not to let fear get the upper hand. As historian Haynes
Johnson notes: In the 1950s, "millions of Americans began to believe civiliza-
tion, life itself, was teetering on the edge of extinction. Out of this devil's brew
of fear, suspicion, and paranoia-and cynical political opportunism-came
McCarthyism." HAYNES JOHNSON, THE AGE OF ANXIETY: MCCARTHYISM TO TER-
RORIsM 4 (2005). "In today's America, no less than in the time of McCarthyism,
fear again contributes to a climate in which abuses of power, infringement of
liberties, and pervasive secrecy thrive." Id.
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decreased in recent years.283 Workplace homicides peaked in
1993 and dropped by nearly forty percent by 2000.284 Neverthe-
less, although the empirical evidence contradicts the Board's
assertion that incidents are increasing, workplace violence
remains a very serious problem. "Employers have a legal and eth-
ical obligation to promote a workplace environment free from
threats and violence ... ."285 The connection between efforts to
defuse workplace violence and the abrogation of Weingarten
rights for non-union employees, however, is extremely tenuous.
Elimination of these rights could even be counterproductive in
preventing tragedies.286
Workplace violence includes a broad spectrum of conduct
ranging from homicide and various kinds of physical assaults to
"domestic violence, stalking, threats, harassment, bullying, emo-
tional abuse, intimidation, and other forms of conduct that cre-
ate anxiety, fear, and a climate of distrust in the workplace."287
These problems fall into four broad categories:
283. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Crime Charac-
teristics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict-C.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2006).
284. In September 2002, FBI supervisory Special Agent Eugene Rugala
testified before a Congressional Committee concerning workplace violence.
He reported on a major study spanning the 1990s that has formed the basis for
much of the FBI's subsequent efforts to address the problem. Rugala noted:
Along with all violent crime occurring in the U.S., there was a decrease
in workplace violent crime. Since approximately 1993, workplace
homicides have been on the decline. Dropping from a peak of over
1000 in the early 1990s to approximately 677 in 2000. It should be
noted that the majority of workplace homicides, about 77%, are the
result of robberies and related crimes.
Emerging Trends in Employment and Labor Law: Examining the Need for Greater Work-
place Security and Control of Workplace Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th
Cong. 41 (2002) (testimony of Eugene Rugala, Supervisory Special Agent, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation). The FBI's most recent statistics confirm that the
trends reported by Supervisory Special Agent Rugala have continued. See FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES
IN RESPONSE 14 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/violence.
pdf [hereinafter WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE]. The FBI report
suggests that perceptions that workplace violence is increasing may result from
increased media attention. See also Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 283.
285. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 15.
286. See infra text accompanying note 304.
287. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 13; see
also Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Dep't. of Labor, Guidelines for
Preventing Workplace Violence for Healthcare and Social Service Workers 4-6
(2004), available at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/OSHA3148/osha3148.
html (describing the extent of the workplace violence problem within the
health care and social service industries).
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TYPE 1:
Violent acts by criminals who have no other connec-
tion with the workplace but enter to commit robbery
or another crime.
TYPE 2:
Violence directed at employees by customers, clients,
patients, students, inmates, or any others for whom an
organization provides services.
TYPE 3:
Violence against co-workers, supervisors, or managers
by a present or former employee.
TYPE 4:
Violence committed in the workplace by someone
who doesn't work there, but has a personal relation-
ship with an employee-an abusive spouse or domes-
tic partner. 28
8
Nearly eighty percent of all workplace violence fits into the
first of these categories, and the majority of incidents involve
workers in retail and service trades.289 The principal means of
preventing these crimes is to improve the physical security of
workplaces-e.g., by installing alarms, security lighting, or bullet-
proof glass-and to ensure that employees are not required to
work alone or in circumstances that make them especially vulner-
able. 29 0 Type 2 violence is a problem in particular industries and
occupations, especially those related to health care,29  while
Type 4 incidents cut across all occupations because they arise out
of domestic living situations rather than workplace
encounters.2 9 2 In all of these circumstances, however, the perpe-
trators are third parties, not employees who can be summoned to
supervisors' offices for investigative interviews.2 9 " Consequently,
288. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 13; see
also Nat'l Inst. of Occupational Safety & Health, Violence in the Workplace:
Introduction, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/violintr.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2006).
289. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 13;
Nat'l Inst. of Occupational Safety & Health, Violence in the Workplace: Pur-
pose and Scope, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/violpurp.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2006) ("Workplace violence is not distributed randomly across all workplaces
but is clustered in particular occupational settings .... Eighty-five percent of
nonfatal assaults in the workplace occur in service and retail trade industries.").
290. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 13.
291. Id. at 14, 54-56.
292. Id. at 13.
293. It is conceivable that Weingarten rights could come into play in some
of these scenarios in a very limited fashion. For example, an employer might
interview employees about a failure to lock a nonpublic entryway or negligent
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withdrawing Weingarten rights from non-union employees will
have no impact whatsoever on the vast majority of incidents
involving workplace violence.
One important category remains, however: Type 3 incidents
involving violence or harassment committed by workers against
other workers or customers. Logic dictates that these are the
types of occurrences employers most often are called upon to
attempt to prevent or punish. For purposes of the present
inquiry, the key question is whether the evisceration of Wein-
garten rights aids in this process. Some of these crimes involve
former employees who return to the workplace to inflict violence
following what they perceive to be unjust termination. 294 These
kinds of situations, like Type 1, 2, and 4 crimes, would rarely
involve Weingarten rights. Nor would issues concerning these
safeguards generally arise with respect to incidents of serious
physical violence, sexual assault, or related threats, because it is
law enforcement authorities, rather than employers, who deal
with major crimes.295
Weingarten rights would most likely come into play in the
subset of instances in which employers must address threats, bul-
lying, various forms of harassment, or perhaps minor physical
contacts involving employees and peers, supervisors, managers,
or customers. Fortunately, experts estimate that as many as
eighty-five percent of incidents of violence by employees and for-
mer employees can be predicted and prevented.296 Aggressive
use of investigative interviews, however, is not among the preven-
tion strategies espoused by the FBI and other leading experts.
Instead, essential elements of effective prevention include estab-
lishing and publicizing a policy prohibiting inappropriate behav-
ior, training managers and employees to recognize and report
the signs most commonly associated with the eruption of vio-
lence, and avoiding a "toxic climate" of suspicion and distrust.297
Other key elements of systems designed to prevent harassment
performance of other security duties, but these instances would be tangential at
best, and they would pale in comparison to the perpetration of the violence
itself.
294. See WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 14.
295. Threats of violence, as well as incidents, should be reported to law
enforcement authorities. "If someone poses a danger to himself or others,
appropriate authorities should be notified and action should be taken." Nat'l
Inst. of Occupational Safety & Health, Violence in the Workplace: Developing
and Implementing a Workplace Violence Prevention Program and Policy,
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/violdev.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
296. Id. at 20.
297. See WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at
19-20.
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and bullying, as well as physical violence, include pre-employ-
ment screening, 298 a strong employee assistance program,299 a
secure, easily accessible system that permits employees to report
misconduct without fear of retribution,"' and "fair and consis-
tent disciplinary procedures."
30 1
While it is important to protect complainants, there is no
evidence that isolating alleged perpetrators or subjecting them to
secret interrogation is likely to resolve problems. "[A] lack of
respect for employees' dignity and rights [is] likely to under-
mine, not support, an employer's violence prevention efforts.
Workers who perceive an employer's practices as unfair or unrea-
sonable will nurse grievances ' 30 2 and develop grudges in
response to perceptions of unfair treatment, feelings that may
fester and erupt into violent behavior at a future date."0 ' At
times, imposing sanctions including "[t]ermination may indeed
be appropriate, but doing so in the heat of the moment without
any time for evaluation or preparation may be exactly the wrong
thing to do, removing the potentially dangerous person from
observation and possibly bringing on a violent act instead of
preventing one."30 4  Rather, employers should focus on
"[a] dopting and practicing fair and consistent disciplinary proce-
298. Many states require criminal record checks for employees engaged
in certain types of work. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 44-552(b) (2001) (requiring
criminal record checks for hospital workers who are not licensed professionals).
299. See Stan Duncan, Ticking Bombs: Defusing Violence in the Workplace, 67
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 17 (Dec. 1998) (reviewing STEVE ALBRECHT, TICKING
BOMBS: DEFFUSING VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE (1994)) ("The author advises
that a good employee assistance program often represents one of the best
security measures that an institution can implement.").
300. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 24-25.
301. Id. at 20. Where there is no immediate victimization, e.g., in cases
involving disgruntled employees whose anger is not focused on any particular
person, co-workers and managers need to know how to recognize signs that
trouble is looming and how to report their concerns. Precipitating factors iden-
tified by the FBI's task force include management failure to communicate rea-
sons for decisions that significantly impact employees, inadequate attention to
job definition and allocation of responsibilities, poor management styles, lack
of availability of employee counseling, and significant events such as layoffs and
downsizing. Id. at 22. Experts stress that it is important for employers to seek
assistance from medical, law enforcement, and other professionals when serious
threats or incidents arise, as well as in instances when upcoming events such as
layoffs may engender emotional reactions by those affected. Id. at 26 (discuss-
ing the importance of establishing assistance contacts as part of workplace vio-
lence plan).
302. Id. at 29.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 26.
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dures"3 °5 and "[fiostering a climate of trust and respect among
workers and between employees and management. 3 0 6 Allowing
an employee to have the support afforded by the presence of a
co-worker in an investigative interview-even if only as a witness
to the event-could serve to defuse an employee's anger, provide
another perspective on the fairness of management procedures,
or at least give the affected employee a sympathetic ear. It would
be naive to assume that anyone who is disciplined as a result of
an investigative interview will praise the fairness of the system,
but isolating and interrogating an employee is not at all consis-
tent with the steps experts recommend to minimize the likeli-
hood of violence in the workplace.
3. Corporate Fiduciary Lapses as a Basis for Limiting Worker
Rights
The IBM Corporation majority's policy analysis is remarkably
unfettered by empirical evidence-perhaps because there is little
if any evidence to validate the conclusions set forth in the opin-
ion. This is particularly true with respect to the notion that the
increasing incidence of "corporate abuse and fiduciary lapses"
3 7
requires curtailment of the rights of line employees. It is ironic
that, as the IBM Corporation dissenters observe, the majority seeks
to utilize restriction of worker rights as a curative for a problem
that is "concentrated in the executive suite, not the employee
cubicle or the factory floor." ' Corporate collapses and other
scandals have cost tens of thousands of jobs, devastated pension
plans, and wreaked havoc with the value of employee stock
purchases.30 9 President Bush has lambasted dishonest corporate
leaders for "hurt[ing] workers who contributed their lives to
building a company that hired them."3' 0 It is ridiculous to sug-
305. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 15.
306. Id. As some commentators state:
If the employer is reluctant to have its conduct in the meeting
observed by another employee and if... the employer is careful not to
tell the employee what it knows about the existence of the [Wein-
garten] right, it seems to us that this describes a relationship in which
there is no real trust whatsoever, in either direction.
Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 214.
307. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 18 (June 9, 2004) (Lieb-
man & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Big Paycheck Is Exhibit A, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 2005, at 1.
310. The President promised the public that the newly created Corporate
Fraud Task Force, composed of members from the Justice Department, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and other federal agencies, would be
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gest that affording managers more freedom to conduct investiga-
tive interviews of line employees will help prevent another Enron
collapse or stop dishonest executives from using company funds
to throw multi-million dollar birthday parties.311
Through Sarbanes-Oxley 12 and other legislative initiatives,
Congress has attempted to curb the misconduct that created
these problems by focusing attention where it belongs-on cor-
porate management.3 13 It makes no sense to contend that the
debacles that have impacted so many American workers justify
depriving these same employees of minimal due process protec-
tions to facilitate discovery of corporate wrongdoing. The notion
that affording managers maximum freedom to investigate
employees will help ferret out corporate scandal and fiduciary
lapses is incredible. One might as well give the fox the keys to
the henhouse and ask him to investigate whether the hens have
been stealing each other's eggs.
Line employees are particularly vulnerable to the risk that
they will become scapegoats.31 4 In most states, an employer may
terminate an employee for refusing to participate in an internal
investigation, even though talking with managers or attorneys
sending a "clear warning and a clear message to every dishonest corporate
leader: You will be exposed and you will be punished .. " President George
Bush, Remarks at the Corporate Fraud Conference (Sept. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020926-10.html.
311. For examples of abuses attributed to various corporate executives in
recent years, see Alex Kuczynski, Lifestyles of the Rich and Red-Faced, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2002, at I1.
312. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Star. 745
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18 & 29 U.S.C.).
313. Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, imposed new obligations and corre-
sponding penalties for violations on chief executive and chief financial officers
of publicly traded companies to certify corporate financial statements.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302 creates new obstruction of justice crimes for tamper-
ing with corporate records and enhances penalties under several existing fed-
eral criminal statutes. Id.
314. See Kathryn W. Tate, Laryer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the
Employee Owed More Protection Than the Model Rules Provide?, 23 IND. L. REV. 1,
7-8, 11-12 (1990). The question of Weingarten rights frequently arises in the
course of corporate internal investigations. See, e.g., Katharine H. Parker et al.,
Conducting an Internal Investigation, 712 PLI/Lit 689, 696 (2004) (noting the
impact of IBM, but observing that in spite of confidentiality concerns,
"[r]egardless of the setting (union or otherwise), the employer may often wish
to have an employee's designated representative at the hearing if only to put a
witness at ease and to avoid later potential disputes regarding representation
rights."). See generally Coyne & Barker, supra note 7. There is, however, reason
for concern that voluntary admission of a third party, however, could waive the
attorney-client or work-product privileges in an internal investigation. See gener-
ally PAUL R. RICE, ATT-ORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1999).
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representing the company may waive the employee's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 1  Conse-
quently, the pressure to cooperate in investigative interviews, par-
ticularly for non-union employees who do not have the benefit of
the procedural protections often conferred by collective bargain-
ing agreements, is intense. In some circumstances, the very
supervisory or management personnel interviewing an employee
may be implicated in the misconduct, or at least bear some share
of the blame for the matter under investigation. In other con-
texts-e.g., investigations conducted by senior managers, compli-
ance officers or corporate counsel-a line employee could easily
admit to engaging in particular conduct without realizing that it
violated company policy or applicable law, while the more culpa-
ble, yet legally more sophisticated superior who initiated the
actions under investigation, remains silent.3 16 Investigative inter-
views also may be fraught with other kinds of land mines, particu-
larly those created by organizational politics.3 17
Whenever an investigative interview encompasses conduct
that might carry criminal penalties-for individuals or entities-
the stakes for participants, particularly line workers, dramatically
increase. If, in the course of an interview, an employee responds
to a question "in a manner which implicates him personally in
criminal conduct, he may have unknowingly lost the value of his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."3 1 ' While
this is true for any employee interviewed by management or by
counsel acting on behalf of the employer, it is particularly worri-
some for lower level workers. Prosecutors often complain that
business entities frequently attempt to protect senior managers
when misconduct is uncovered. 3 9 There is, however, no analo-
315. Coyne & Barker, supra note 7, at 173-79, 190-91. Some states have
codified the duty to cooperate, while in others, courts have held that it is
implicit or implied by law in every employer-employee relationship. Id. at
170-72. Some labor arbitrators, however, have ruled in favor of employees
who have refused to provide evidence in the course of an internal investigation
on the basis of a 'constitutional-type analysis.' See, e.g., id. at 177; Marvin F. Hill,
Jr. & James A. Wright, Employee Refusals to Cooperate in Internal Investigations: "Into
the Woods" with Employers, Courts and Labor Arbitrators, 56 Mo. L. REv. 869,
889-97, 924 n.302 (1991). Employees, however, do not have a right to counsel
in investigative interviews. Coyne & Barker, supra note 7, at 178-79; see also
Heldman et al., supra note 9, at 206 (noting that Weingarten rights are vastly
weaker than Miranda rights).
316. See Duggin, supra note *, at 909.
317. See id.
318. Tate, supra note 314, at 3-4; see also Coyne & Barker, supra note 7, at
173-77.
319. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 162, at
VII1 (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_
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gous phenomenon where lower level workers are concerned. It
is almost always in an employer's best interests to throw a min-
now to the sharks in the hope that they will be satisfied with a
snack instead of pursuing bigger fish.
The Board also fails to recognize that the fruits of many
kinds of investigative efforts are now, far more than ever before,
turned over to government authorities.3 2 ° Consequently, what
an employee says in the course of an investigative interview may
result in consequences far greater than workplace discipline or
even job loss-her statements could land her in jail without ben-
efit of any of the constitutional safeguards that would protect her
in direct dealings with law enforcement authorities. 32 1 This phe-
nomenon is an outgrowth of the growing insistence of govern-
ment authorities on waiver of the corporate attorney-client and
work-product privileges as a prerequisite for participation in vol-
untary disclosure programs, plea negotiations, and other
arrangements. 322 This is an occurrence now so frequent that the
American Bar Association created a special task force to address
the assault on the attorney-client privilege,3 2 3 and in August
2005, the ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution decrying
this erosion of the corporate attorney-client privilege. 4 Conse-
quently, the stakes of participating in workplace investigations-
particularly interviews that are part of corporate internal investi-
room/usam/title9/crm00162.htm (noting that "[elmployee discipline is a diffi-
cult task for many corporations because of the human element involved and
sometimes because of the seniority of the employees concerned").
320. See, e.g., Duggin, supra note *, at 899-907; David M. Zornow & Keith
D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate
Criminal Investigations, 37 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 147, 153-56 (2002).
321. Duggin, supra note *, at 907-09; Tate, supra note 314, at 3-4.
322. See Duggin, supra note *, at 899-901; Zornow & KrakaIr, supra note
320, at 153-56.
323. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE,
Am. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2005),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/
report.pdf; Press Release, Presidential Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Task Force Supports Attorney-Client Privilege as First
Line of Defense Against Corrupt Corporations (June 15, 2005), available at
http://www.abanews.org/releases/news061505.html.
324. See Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association (Aug. 9, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/
reportlll.pdf. The ABA and a coalition of other interested parties recently
succeeded in persuading the U.S. Sentencing Commission to delete a reference
to privilege waiver as a condition for "cooperation" from the Commentary to
§ 8C2.5(g) of the Organization Guidelines. Marcia Coyle, Business Wins Big on
Thorny Waiver Issue, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 10, 2006, at P4. This change should lessen
the problem to some extent, but it will not eliminate it given current Depart-
ment of Justice policies.
WEINGARTEN RIGHTS FOR NON-UNION EMPLOYEES
gations-are higher than ever before, and the need for the pres-
ence of a co-worker to provide moral support and to witness the
interview is greater now than ever.325
In sum, the IBM Corporation majority is correct that the prev-
alence of corporate scandal and fiduciary lapses uncovered in
recent years has given rise to a whole new set of policy concerns
relevant to workplace investigations. This newly revealed reality,
however, suggests that line employees need more, not less, pro-
tection in investigative interviews.
IV. WEINGARTEN RIGHTS SHOULD BE AFFORDED TO
ALL WORKERS
Examination of the IBM Corporation majority's analysis dem-
onstrates two fundamental flaws. First, many of the majority's
assumptions are clearly erroneous. The majority misunderstands
the reasons why corporate investigations have expanded; fails to
offer any plausible reason why employers, rather than law
enforcement authorities, would need to interview employees in
connection with suspected terrorist activities; evidences little
understanding of the nature of workplace violence and the mea-
sures necessary to address it effectively; and utterly fails to
explain why tipping the balance of power in the workplace in
favor of management will ameliorate rather than exacerbate cor-
porate fiduciary lapses.
Second, as a recent article points out, "the boundaries set by
Weingarten do not erode the employer's power to discipline
employees; rather, they help to protect the fairness of the investi-
gative process."' 26 Virtually every significant objection the IBM
Corporation majority raises to affording Weingarten rights to non-
union workers could be readily addressed with a dose of com-
mon sense. An employee summoned to an investigative inter-
view is unlikely to request the presence of a co-worker he or she
does not trust with personal information, and there is no reason
to believe that a co-worker is more likely to divulge sensitive
information than the interviewee. Taking steps to protect the
confidentiality of other information may require no more than
requesting those present to exercise discretion, or, if necessary,
325. It is also important to note that the IBM Corporation majority's point
that an employer may voluntarily choose to permit a non-union co-worker to
attend an interview neglects to consider the consequences of doing so with
respect to the protections of the attorney-client privilege in the context of inter-
nal investigations. Voluntary admission of a third party in such situations could
arguably waive the employer's attorney-client privilege. See RICE, supra note 315.
326. O'Brien, supra note 9, at 113.
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imposing a reasonable confidentiality policy for the duration of a
sensitive investigation. 27 Fears that employees will seek repre-
sentation by alleged co-conspirators could be assuaged by
allowing management to refuse co-worker representation by
employees arguably implicated in the conduct under investiga-
tion, provided they do so in good faith.3 2 ' The NLRB already
"has developed a highly nuanced body of law under Wein-
garten,329 for unionized employees that could be adapted as
appropriate to the non-union context. This body of law
addresses important contours of Weingarten rights ranging from
the nature of triggering events to the choice and role of repre-
sentatives and remedies for violations.33 ° As Members Liebman
and Walsh point out in their IBM Corporation dissent, the Board's
termination of Weingarten rights has cut short the development of
an analogous body of law with respect to co-worker
representation.33
Undoubtedly, there are many reasons for the decreasing
rate of unionization in the United States, particularly in the pri-
vate sector.332 The reality, however, is that the vast majority of
Americans do not belong to unions. Consequently, most of this
country's workers are susceptible to the very problems that Wein-
garten rights help to mitigate, particularly the unfair imposition
of disciplinary sanctions and scapegoating. As the experts assem-
bled by the Federal Workplace Violence Initiative observe, disci-
pline "must be-and must be seen to be-proportionate,
consistent, reasonable, and fair"3"3 if we are to continue to make
headway against workplace violence. The same could be said of
efforts to restore confidence in the integrity of corporate manag-
ers and to reassure all Americans that steps taken in the name of
counter-terrorism are actually directed at suspected terrorists,
327. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 169.
329. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 7, at 528.
330. See id. at 528-30; see generally Moberly & Lisenbee, supra note 9.
331. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 23 (June 9, 2004) (Lieb-
man & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
332. See Craver, supra note 5; Roger C. Hartley, The Failure of Democracy in
Union Governance, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 13, 15 (1982) (noting impact of doctrinal
fragmentation on union cohesion); Steven Greenhouse, A.FL.-C.I.O. Leader
Says Split Hurts Labor, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A14 (noting effect of recent
withdrawal of powerful service unions from A.F.L.-C.I.O. on political clout of
labor movement); George Will, Labor Union Clout Is Not What It Once Was, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 21, 2005, at A27 (attributing decreasing effectiveness of strikes
and other labor action to fact that "[a] strike, to be effective, must withdraw
skills that cannot be replaced and there seem to be fewer of them than there
once were").
333. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE, supra note 284, at 29.
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rather than used as an excuse to eliminate the rights of those
who are most vulnerable. The fundamental principles of the
NLRA apply to all workers whether or not they belong to unions.
The IBM Corporation majority seems to have forgotten that
the core objective of the NLRA is "to eliminate the 'inequality of
bargaining power between employees . . . and employers"" by
making it possible for employees to engage in concerted action
for their mutual benefit and protection.335 It is no answer to say
that whistleblower laws offer adequate protection, for it blinks
reality to believe that most workers will have the wherewithal to
position themselves in a way that will invoke statutory protec-
tions. In any event, where employers break the law, a
whistleblower's path is long and hard, and chances of success are
low. 336
A non-unionized employee facing interrogation by an
employer is at an enormous disadvantage, regardless of guilt or
innocence of the misconduct under investigation. Permitting an
employee to turn to a co-worker for support-even if that co-
worker does no more in the interview than sit quietly by as a wit-
ness to the events that take place-does not do a great deal to
minimize the relative inequality inherent in the employer-
employee relationship. Nevertheless, it does something. The
presence of the co-worker benefits both the interviewee and all
employees by providing a check against arbitrary decisions by
employers. It also serves broader societal interests by prodding
management to ensure that disciplinary proceedings are reasona-
bly fair and appropriately conducted and by decreasing the
chances that an employee will feel so isolated and mistreated that
he or she will turn to violence as a solution. Conversely, as his-
tory teaches, secrecy breeds abuse and hostility.
Terrorism and workplace violence have destroyed far too
many lives and created far too much anxiety over the physical
safety of innocent people. The spectacular fall from grace of
Enron and other leading corporations has caused still others to
334. NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 262 (1975) (discussing 29
U.S.C. § 151).
335. Id. at 260.
336. Sarbanes-Oxley strengthened federal whistleblower protection laws
pertaining to corporate financial matters, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1)-(2) (A)
(1982) (allowing for temporary restraining orders prohibiting harassment of a
victim or witness in a federal criminal case), and forty-two states reportedly now
have whistleblower statutes. Leonard M. Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analy-
sis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 76 S7. JOHN's L. REv. 875, 888 (2002). Unfortunately, however, "low-
level employees are ... relatively unprotected," id. at 892, and "a deft supervisor
could set up the whistleblowing employee for failure." Id. at 895.
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fear financial insecurity, particularly those who have lostjobs, sav-
ings, and pensions as a result of executive misconduct. It is easy
to say that we must do everything in our power to prevent recur-
rences of these events, but the desire to do so should not blind
decision makers to the inequity of actions that discriminate
against the victims instead of protecting them from the real per-
petrators of wrongdoing. If there are any legitimate arguments
against Weingarten rights for all workers, prevention of terrorism,
corporate fiduciary lapses, and workplace violence are not
among them.
The NLRB needs to take a fresh look at the propriety of
extending Weingarten rights to non-union employees. In so
doing, its members should follow the same standards society
expects of the corporate decision-makers whose interests the
majority so zealously seeks to safeguard. While its dictates are
sometimes forgotten, the business judgment rule, a cornerstone
of corporate law, presumes that corporate managers act "on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken [is] in the best interests of the [ir] company."3 37 In
turn, "[t] he determination whether a business judgment is an
informed one turns on whether the directors have informed
themselves 'prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them.'" 33 8 It is difficult to
see how a fully informed analysis of the relevant policy considera-
tions could lead anyone to conclude that Weingarten rights
should be limited to unionized employees. Instead, these rights
should be afforded to all American workers and enhanced in at
least one important respect-all employees should have an
opportunity to learn that they exist.33 9 If the Board fails to come
to grips with the needs of the vast majority of American workers,
Congress should step in to amend the NLRA to provide a statu-
tory guarantee of Weingarten rights.
CONCLUSION
NLRB Members Liebman and Walsh clearly have the better
of the arguments over Weingarten rights for non-union employ-
ees. As they point out, in the aftermath of the IBM Corporation
decision, "American workers without unions, the overwhelming
majority of employees, are stripped of a right integral to work-
337. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aron-
son v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
338. Id.
339. Currently, employers have no obligation to inform employees of the
existence of Weingarten rights. See supra note 43.
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place democracy. '3 4 ° IBM Corporation requires line employees to
forfeit Weingarten rights because of the fiduciary lapses of corpo-
rate elites, the misjudgments of intelligence agencies, the misdi-
rected focus of political leaders, and the reprehensible conduct
of the perpetrators of fraud and violence. The Board's decision
is wrong. American workers should not be forced to pay a price
that will never buy freedom from terrorism, workplace violence,
or dishonest executives.
340. IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. No. 148, slip op. at 18 (June 9, 2004) (Lieb-
man & Walsh, Members, dissenting).
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